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Environmental Law Outside the Canon 
TODD S. AAGAARD* 
It is time to rethink the domination of environmental law by a canon of major 
federal statutes enacted in the 1970s. Environmental law is in a malaise. Despite 
widespread agreement that existing laws are inadequate to address current 
environmental problems, Congress has not passed a major environmental statute in 
more than twenty years.  If it is to succeed, the environmental law of this new 
century may need to evolve into something that looks quite different than the extant 
environmental law canon. The next generation of environmental laws must be 
viable for creation and implementation even in an antagonistic political climate; 
amenable to integration with other, non-environmental law; and able to make 
inroads against the monumental peril of global climate change. Environmental 
laws embedded in larger non-environmental programs and dispersed throughout 
government offer an alternative model to the environmental law canon—an 
alternative model that seems well suited to help environmental law address these 
daunting challenges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Environmental law has a clear canon of statutes that attract the bulk of attention 
in environmental law cases, courses, and treatises. The canon consists of four major 
anti-pollution statutes administered by the Environmental Protection Agency—the 
Clean Air Act;1 Clean Water Act;2 Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA);3 and Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA)4—along with two other statutes, the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)5 and Endangered Species Act (ESA).6 Congress 
enacted the statutes comprising the canon in the 1970s, during what has been called 
the Environmental Law Revolution.7 At the time, environmental protection was a 
bipartisan issue, and the major environmental statutes were enacted with 
“overwhelming majorities” and “lopsided votes.”8 The new statutes were highly 
ambitious in their aims, consistent with the idea that a revolution was indeed at 
hand.9 
In the decades since the Environmental Law Revolution, however, the optimism 
that imbued the canonical environmental statutes has faded. Environmental law 
suffers from a “mid-life crisis,”10 or at least a “malaise.”11 Environmental 
lawmaking in Congress has stagnated. Despite widespread agreement that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 7. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in the Era of 
Reinvention: The Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 717 (1999); 
Robert L. Fischman, What Is Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 717, 720 (2007); 
J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law 
and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1459 (1996); 
see also Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 
1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 165 n.30 (“[T]here can be no doubt about the revolutionary 
nature of the legislation.”). 
 8. See Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in Environmental 
Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 1002, 1003 n.17 (2003); see also Richard N.L. Andrews, The 
EPA at 40: An Historical Perspective, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 223, 224 (2011) 
(noting that in the early 1970s “solidly bipartisan majorities [in Congress] vested this new 
agency [(EPA)] with sweeping new powers”); Percival, supra note 7, at 165 (1997) (noting 
that the major environmental statutes of the 1970s were enacted with “overwhelming, 
bipartisan support”). 
 9. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (“[I]t is the national 
goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.”); 
Clean Air Act § 109(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1) (directing EPA to publish proposed 
regulations prescribing air quality standards within thirty days of the statute’s enactment). 
See generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 67−73 (2004). 
 10. See, e.g., Linda A. Malone, Looking Beyond Environmental Law’s Mid-Life Crisis, 
23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 679, 680 (2006). 
 11. Holly Doremus, Reinvigorating the Union of Wonder and Power, 24 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 281, 281 (2005). 
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inadequacies exist in the canonical environmental law statutes, Congress has not 
passed a major environmental statute since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990. Both parties have failed in attempts to pass their key environmental 
legislative initiatives,12 and bipartisan legislative efforts on environmental issues 
have been virtually unheard of. As the Breaking the Logjam Project has noted, “For 
almost 20 years, political polarization and a lack of leadership have left 
environmental protection in the United States burdened with obsolescent statutes 
and regulatory strategies.”13 The political climate has become even more 
acrimonious of late, as EPA has become a lightning rod for opponents of 
government regulation.14 
Meanwhile, although the canonical environmental statutes have resulted in some 
dramatic reductions in pollution,15 environmental threats loom large. Many 
environmental harms continue relatively unregulated.16 New regulatory challenges 
arise as advancements in science identify new hazards.17 The threat from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. See, e.g., Clear Skies—Legislative Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/clearskies
/legis.html (noting that the Bush Administration’s Clear Skies bill “never moved out of the 
Senate Environment and Public Works committee in 2005 and was therefore never enacted”) 
(last updated May 18, 2012); see also Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 
11, 2010, at 70 (detailing the demise of the Obama Administration’s climate change bill in 
the Senate). 
 13. Carol A. Casazza Herman, David Schoenbrod, Richard B. Stewart & Katrina M. 
Wyman, Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New Congress and 
Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2008); see also Laurie Ristino & Sam Kalen, 
Is Environmental Law Serving Society?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2012, at 52, 
52−53 (“Little doubt exists that our middle-aged environmental programs are shouldering 
challenges not particularly well-suited to their statutory frameworks.”); William 
Ruckelshaus, A New Shade of Green, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2010, at R1 (“[T]he solutions we 
devised back in the 1970s aren’t likely to make much of a dent in the environmental 
problems we face today[,] . . . [even though] [c]onsiderable progress has been made thanks 
to those early laws.”). 
 14. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Bashing E.P.A. Is New Theme in G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 18, 2011, at A1; John M. Broder, House Votes to Bar E.P.A. from Regulating Emissions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2011, at A17; Robin Bravender & Gabriel Nelson, Republicans Blitz 
Obama over EPA’s ‘Anti-Industrial’ Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/09/28/28greenwire-republicans-blitz-obama-over-epas
-anti-industr-84657.html. 
 15. See, e.g., EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990, at ES-
2–ES-3 (1997) (reporting that the Clean Air Act reduced sulfur dioxide emissions by 40%, 
nitrogen oxides emissions by 30%, volatile organic compound emissions by 45%, carbon 
monoxide emissions by 50%, primary particulate emissions by 75%, and lead emissions by 
99% as compared with what they otherwise would have been in 1990 without the Act). 
 16. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 
27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 265 (2000) (“[F]arms are virtually unregulated by the expansive 
body of environmental law that has developed in the United States in the past 30 years.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Nanotechnology and the Environment: What’s 
Next?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2012, at 51, 51–52 (noting that nanotechnology is 
an “emerging industrial hazard[] requiring safety research and regulation” and the 
inadequacy of “existing applicable statutes . . . enacted at a time when the unique challenges 
of nanotechnology were not yet contemplated”). 
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anthropogenic global climate change, the worst environmental problem in human 
history, continues to grow even as efforts to enact comprehensive climate policy 
seem more and more beyond reach.18 
Environmental law’s malaise in the face of challenges that would be daunting 
even in the best of circumstances suggests that this is an opportune time to 
investigate alternative models for environmental lawmaking. To do so, however, 
requires rethinking the environmental law canon’s predominance within the field of 
environmental law. Environmental law scholarship, practice, and teaching tend to 
focus on the environmental law canon, to the neglect of other environmental laws.19 
This inattention to environmental laws outside the canon is understandable, 
because such laws do not compare to the environmental law canon in terms of size 
or prominence. But noncanonical environmental laws are nevertheless an important 
category of environmental law that deserves more attention for at least three related 
reasons. First, noncanonical environmental law has distinctive characteristics that 
cohere it as a category and differentiate it from canonical environmental law. 
Second, noncanonical environmental law provides an alternative model for 
environmental lawmaking that may offer significant advantages over relying 
wholly on the environmental law canon to address the challenges currently facing 
environmental law. Third, noncanonical environmental law, because it is atypical 
of environmental law, offers unique vantage points from which to gain insights into 
the field of environmental law as a whole. This Article proceeds in three parts, each 
of which is affiliated with one of these three points. 
Part I describes the topography of environmental law as a whole. Mapping the 
field expands the recognized domain of environmental law beyond the canon. It 
also helps to identify both common and distinguishing characteristics of 
environmental law. Although environmental laws share some defining 
characteristics, other key features distinguish among environmental laws. These 
distinguishing features explain functional differences among environmental laws 
and define useful categories of environmental law. In particular, environmental 
laws outside the canon exhibit functional characteristics that differ markedly from 
canonical environmental law, creating possible alternatives to environmental law in 
its canonical form.20 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See infra Part II.E.3. 
 19. Cf. Austin B. Caswell, Canonicity in Academia: A Music Historian’s View, J. 
AESTHETIC EDUC., Fall 1991, at 129, 129 (asserting that “the tyranny of canonicity” can be 
“destructive of our critical faculties”). 
 20. As Part I makes clear, environmental law includes laws at a variety of levels of 
government, from international to local. See infra notes 64–71 and accompanying text. 
While acknowledging this range, this Article’s examination of environmental law outside the 
canon focuses primarily on noncanonical federal environmental law for three reasons. First, 
federal environmental statutes outside the canon are an alternative readily available to 
Congress, the lawmaking institution responsible for the creation of the federal environmental 
law canon. Second, the possibility of state environmental regulation, because of the 
federalism issues it raises, has not suffered from the same degree of inattention that afflicts 
other environmental law outside of the canon. Third and finally, focusing on federal 
environmental statutes outside of the canon gives the Article a more manageable scope. That 
being said, state environmental laws, addressing issues ranging from pollution to fish and 
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Part II focuses on a particular subspecies of noncanonical environmental law 
that I call embedded environmental laws. Embedded environmental laws are 
environmental statutes or statutory provisions embedded within larger programs 
that are not primarily environmental and that are usually administered by agencies 
not primarily engaged in environmental lawmaking—for example, the federal 
excise tax on ozone-depleting chemicals administered by the Internal Revenue 
Service,21 or limitations on the importation of illegally harvested timber 
administered by the Agricultural Plant and Health Inspection Service.22 Embedded 
environmental laws offer an alternative model for environmental lawmaking that 
may help address some of the major challenges currently facing environmental law, 
including legislative stagnation, integration of environmental law with law from 
other fields, and policies to address global climate change. 
Part III explores conceptual insights that the study of noncanonical 
environmental laws can generate. Including noncanonical environmental laws in 
the study of environmental law reveals a field that is more diverse in both content 
and history than conventional accounts of environmental law that focus on the 
canon. Noncanonical environmental laws also can, by virtue of their location at the 
periphery of environmental law, shed light on some of the field’s existential issues, 
such as defining the boundaries of what regulatory objectives qualify as 
environmental. Such questions have practical as well as theoretical import—
whether a law is classified as environmental or some other category determines, for 
example, what congressional committee and what agency are likely to control it. 
An examination of noncanonical environmental laws reveals that the boundaries of 
environmental law are blurry and overlap significantly with other fields. The 
creation, study, and practice of environmental law should better reflect and address 
this messy reality. 
I. MAPPING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Environmental law encompasses far more law than the few federal statutes that 
comprise the environmental law canon and that predominate in the field.23 The field 
                                                                                                                 
game to land use to water rights to renewable energy standards, exhibit a rich diversity of 
features and warrant additional scholarly examination as a category of their own. 
 21. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681–4682 (2006). See generally Janet E. Milne, Environmental 
Taxation in the United States: The Long View, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 417 (2011). 
 22. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 8204, 122 
Stat. 1651, 2052–56. 
 23. For the purposes of this Article, the field of environmental law is defined to 
encompass laws that reflect a consideration of human impacts on the natural environment. 
See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 
95 CORNELL L. Rev. 221, 263 (2010) (arguing in favor of this definition among several 
alternatives). This definition is not limited to laws with the only or overriding purpose of 
protecting the environment, because environmental laws reflect a balance of objectives, 
including but not limited to environmental protection. This definition also excludes laws that 
unintentionally affect the environment. Even accepting this definition, however, laws are not 
necessarily susceptible to simple classification as environmental or not. For example, the 
common law of nuisance is not aimed specifically at the environment, but it has important 
applications to remedying environmental problems. See, e.g., State v. Ventron Corp., 468 
A.2d 150, 157 (N.J. 1983) (holding under common law of nuisance that landowners are 
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of environmental law can be classified into several categories based on gradations 
of prominence: the canon, a subcanon of diminished prominence but still relatively 
familiar laws, and finally noncanonical environmental laws, which are either 
primarily associated with other fields or simply altogether obscure. Figure 1 
represents these categories of environmental law as a series of concentric circles, in 
order of increasing prominence as one approaches the center of the circle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Categories of environmental law. 
 
Although all environmental laws share certain features in common,24 other 
features vary among different environmental laws. These differentiating features 
affect how the laws function. Moreover, the environmental law canon shares a 
strong commonality of features not representative of the diversity of the field as a 
whole. Because of differences in their characteristics, environmental laws outside 
                                                                                                                 
strictly liable for harm caused by toxic wastes stored on their property that flow onto the 
property of others); see also infra Part III (examining how environmental laws outside the 
canon help to define the scope of the field). 
 24. In previous articles, I have explored the features that environmental laws share in 
common and that distinguish environmental law from other legal fields. See Todd S. Aagaard, 
Environmental Harms, Use Conflicts, and Neutral Baselines in Environmental Law, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 1505 (2011) [hereinafter Aagaard, Use Conflicts]; Aagaard, supra note 23. These previous 
articles argued that environmental lawmaking is best understood as the management of 
conflicts among uses of environmental resources. See Aagaard, Use Conflicts, supra, at 
1525−27; Aagaard, supra note 23, at 264−69, 275. Environmental resources share certain 
characteristics: they are physical; they are publicly rather than privately valued, owned, and 
controlled; and they serve as media for pervasively interrelated ecological systems. See 
Aagaard, supra note 23, at 264−69. Environmental problems arise when potential uses of 
environmental resources conflict. See Aagaard, Use Conflicts, supra, at 1526; Aagaard, supra 
note 23, at 275. Moreover, the characteristics of resources are such that conflicts, when they 
arise, tend to be intense, complicated, and multidimensional. See Aagaard, Use Conflicts, 
supra, at 1527. Here, by contrast to these earlier works examining commonalities among 
environmental laws, my focus is on distinguishing among environmental laws. 
Canonical
Subcanonical
Non-canonical
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of the canon do not function the same as canonical environmental laws. These 
functional differences establish noncanonical environmental laws as a distinct 
category of environmental law, with the potential to provide an alternative model 
for environmental lawmaking. 
A. Differentiating Features 
Apart from the features that environmental laws share in common,25 other 
characteristics distinguish among environmental laws. These differentiating 
features include the role of environmental protection, the specific subject matter, 
the endpoints, the type of environmental media, the regulatory and nonregulatory 
mechanisms, the targets, the form, the implementing institution, the level of 
government, and the breadth. Different categories of environmental law exhibit 
different patterns of these characteristics. One of the central challenges for 
environmental lawmaking is matching the specific attributes of an environmental 
problem with the most appropriate mix of features for the environmental law that 
responds to the problem. 
Role of Environmental Protection. Although a general goal of environmental 
protection is a feature common to all environmental laws, environmental protection 
plays varying roles in environmental laws. Some environmental laws are enacted 
primarily to protect human health and the environment.26 Some laws are enacted in 
part to protect the environment, but not necessarily as its primary goal—
mixed-motive environmental law, this category might be called.27 Closely related to 
the role of environmental protection in an environmental law is the strength of that 
protection and the degree of its departure from the status quo. Even among two 
statutes focused on environmental protection, environmental protection has a 
different role in a statute that calls for studying an environmental problem28 than in 
a statute that imposes regulatory measures to remedy the problem.29 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. See supra note 24 (citing and summarizing my prior work examining features that 
environmental laws share in common). 
 26. See, e.g., Noise Control Act of 1972 § 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4901(b) (2006) (“The 
Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to promote an environment for all 
Americans free from noise that jeopardizes their health or welfare.”).  
 27. See, e.g., Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012) (“It is 
the policy of the Congress that the national forests are established and shall be administered for 
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.”). Many other 
laws significantly but unintentionally affect the physical environment—positively, adversely, 
or both. Such laws are not part of environmental law per se, although they merit increased 
attention from environmental law scholars, teachers, and practitioners. See infra Part II.E.2. 
 28. See, e.g., United States-Japan Fishery Agreement Approval Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 
100-220, § 2202, 101 Stat. 1458, 1465 (1987) (directing EPA, in consultation with the 
Commerce Department, to “commence a study of the adverse effects of the improper 
disposal of plastic articles on the environment and on waste disposal, and the various 
methods to reduce or eliminate such adverse effects”). 
 29. See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act § 4004, 42 U.S.C. § 6944 (2006) (directing state 
plans to require the disposal of solid waste in sanitary landfills that comply with federal 
regulations). 
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Subject Matter. Although they share a common focus on the environment, 
environmental laws address different subject matters. The most prominent 
distinction drawn is between pollution laws and natural resource laws.30 Indeed, 
because of strong differences between pollution laws and natural resource laws, 
opinions differ as to whether natural resource laws fall within the field of 
environmental law or instead constitute a separate but related legal field.31 Within 
pollution laws, one can differentiate laws that govern pollution abatement from 
laws that govern pollution remediation.32 Other environmental laws, such as laws 
that address environmental processes and information33 and laws that restrict the 
sale or use of substances,34 are not easy to classify as pollution or natural resource. 
Differences in subject matter affect how environmental laws function. For example, 
the conceptual paradigm for pollution statutes is regulating externalities arising 
from the use of private property, such as the Clean Air Act’s regulation of air 
pollutant emissions.35 The conceptual paradigm for natural resource statutes, on the 
other hand, is regulating use of open access public resources, such as the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act’s land use planning process.36 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of 
Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 662 (2008) (referring to pollution and 
natural resources as “the two main lines of environmental law”). 
 31. See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 7, at 718 (noting the debate and expressing the author’s 
preference “to use the term ‘environmental law’ broadly to describe the subject encompassing 
both pollution control and resource management”). 
 32. See Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 
IDAHO L. REV. 473, 487–88 (2010); see also Lincoln L. Davies, Energy Policy Today and 
Tomorrow—Toward Sustainability?, 29 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 76–77 (2009) 
(using slightly different terminology). Pollution abatement, such as the Clean Air Act and Clean 
Water Act, “aim to reduce, or mitigate, pollution,” and pollution remediation laws such as the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) “seek to 
clean up existing pollution, or to ensure its proper disposal.” Davies, Alternative Energy and the 
Energy-Environment Disconnect, supra, at 487. 
 33. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321−4370h (2006 and Supp. V 2011); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001−11050 (2006). 
 34. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 136−136y (2012); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601−2697 (2012). 
 35. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006) (directing EPA to issue 
standards of performance for new stationary sources of air pollution). 
 36. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 202(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) 
(2006) (“The Secretary shall, with public involvement and consistent with the terms and 
conditions of this Act, develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which 
provide by tracts or areas for the use of the public lands.”). Notwithstanding the distinction that 
can be made between externalities and open access resources, the two concepts are of course 
related and often arise in combination. Pollution externalities, for example, generally operate via 
the medium of an open access resource such as the ambient air or a waterway. See Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 (1968). And the congestion effects 
of overusing an open access resource are a form of externality. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a 
Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 351 (1967). 
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Endpoints. Environmental law encompasses laws that regulate to protect human 
health as impacted by the natural environment,37 other human uses of environmental 
resources,38 and ecological health directly.39 Many environmental laws regulate to 
protect both human and ecological health.40 Pollution statutes generally have tended 
to focus more on human health impacts than on ecological health, whereas natural 
resource statutes have tended to focus more on ecological health than on human 
health. 
Media. Environmental resources are commonly classified into media—usually 
water, air, and land.41 Many environmental laws aim at regulating specific 
environmental media—for example, the Clean Water Act regulates water pollution, 
the Clean Air Act regulates air pollution, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act regulates 
contamination of soil and groundwater. Other laws, such as the Toxic Substances 
Control Act, which regulates the safety of chemicals in commerce, are not 
media-specific. Differences in physical characteristics across media have important 
implications for regulating to protect that type of resources from pollution.42 
Airsheds, for example, can be much more complicated to manage than watersheds.43 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (directing EPA to publish 
national primary ambient air quality standards “to protect the public health”). 
 38. See, e.g., Clean Air Act §§ 169A–169B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7491–7492 (establishing program 
to improve visibility in certain designated areas where “visibility is an important value”). 
 39. See, e.g., ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (2012) (stating Congress’s policy under 
the ESA “to conserve endangered species and threatened species”). 
 40. See, e.g., TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2012) (authorizing EPA to regulate 
substances that “present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment”); Clean 
Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2006) (establishing “the national goal that wherever 
attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of 
fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water”); RCRA 
§ 1003(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(4) (2006) (stating an objective of “assuring that hazardous 
waste management practices are conducted in a manner which protects human health and the 
environment”); CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2006) (authorizing the Attorney 
General to file an action in federal district court in the case of “an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or 
threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility”). 
 41. See, e.g., Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrated Environmental Control: The Expanding 
Matrix, 22 ENVTL. L. 77, 83 (1992); Nigel D. Key & Jonathan D. Kaplan, Multiple 
Environmental Externalities and Manure Management Policy, 32 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 
115, 115 (2007); Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law and the Supreme Court: Three Years 
Later, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653, 662 (2002).  
 42. Cf. LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 71−72 (explaining that the Clean Air Act and Clean 
Water Act were each “reflective of the distinct physical features of the [type of pollution] it 
addressed”). 
 43. Rich Poirot, Paul Wishinski, Bret Schichtel & Phil Girton, Air Trajectory Pollution 
Climatology for the Lake Champlain Basin, in LAKE CHAMPLAIN IN TRANSITION: FROM 
RESEARCH TOWARD RESTORATION 25, 25−26 (Thomas O. Manley & Patricia L. Manley, eds., 
1999) (noting that the Lake Champlain watershed is “clearly defined by fixed geographical 
boundaries,” whereas “the spatial and temporal variations of emission sources and 
meteorological conditions, make it virtually impossible to develop a fixed definition of airshed” 
(emphasis in original)). Even where environmental laws attempt to regulate specifically to 
particular media, environmental media cannot be fully segregated. Contaminants in air pollution, 
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Mechanisms. Environmental laws employ a variety of regulatory and 
nonregulatory mechanisms, including environmental quality-based standards, 
emissions limits based on technology standards, tradable emissions permitting, 
pollution charges, liability, information reporting and disclosure requirements, use 
limitations, subsidies, and technical assistance.44 Many environmental statutes include 
a combination of multiple mechanisms, and major environmental statutes may 
include virtually all of them in some form.45 
Regulatory Targets. Some environmental laws regulate the private sector 
directly,46 and some regulate government action qua sovereign.47 Many statutes 
involve a mix of governmental and private sector regulatory targets. Most of the 
major environmental statutes regulate federal facilities as well as privately owned and 
operated pollution sources.48 Statutes that ultimately aim at regulating private sector 
conduct may include detailed requirements for the government agencies that 
implement them.49 Statutes that regulate government action qua sovereign indirectly 
regulate the private sector—for example, if NEPA requires the Army Corps of 
Engineers to prepare an Environmental Assessment before granting a permit allowing 
a private developer to fill a wetland,50 then the developer feels the regulatory effects 
of NEPA as much as, if not more than, the Corps of Engineers does. 
Form. Environmental laws take a variety of forms, including treaties,51 
statutes,52 administrative regulations,53 court decisions,54 and common law 
                                                                                                                 
for example, can pollute water or land through atmospheric deposition. See Gary M. Lovett, 
Atmospheric Deposition of Nutrients and Pollutants in North America: An Ecological 
Perspective, 4 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 629 (1994). 
 44. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-ENV-634, ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY TOOLS: A USER’S GUIDE 81−142 (1995). 
 45. See Andrews, supra note 8, at 231–32 (noting the different regulatory mechanisms 
Congress enacted in the new federal environmental statutes of the 1970s). 
 46. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006) (prohibiting, with certain 
specified exceptions, “the discharge of any pollutant by any person”). 
 47. See, e.g., NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006) (directing federal agencies to 
prepare environmental impact statements for proposed major federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the environment). 
 48. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (providing that federal facilities 
“shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, 
administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water 
pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity”); Clean Air 
Act § 118(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (2006) (providing that federal facilities “shall be subject to, and 
comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and 
process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of air pollution in the same manner, 
and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity”). 
 49. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (requiring a state 
seeking EPA approval of its state implementation plans to provide assurances that it “will have 
adequate personnel, funding, and authority . . . to carry out such implementation plan”). 
 50. See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1274 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 51. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 52. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 53. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 
 54. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007); Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
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doctrines.55 Although environmental laws are generally easily classified by form,56 
the different forms are also highly interrelated. Statutes may implement treaties.57 
Administrative regulations implement statutes.58 Courts’ interpretations of statutes 
become functionally part of the statutes themselves.59 Statutes may incorporate 
common law doctrines.60 
Implementing Institution. Environmental laws are implemented by different 
institutions. Some environmental laws, such as common law environmental torts, are 
primarily implemented by private parties and courts through litigation. Most 
environmental laws, however, are implemented by an administrative agency of some 
form. Within this category, there is substantial diversity. It matters to the functioning 
of a law whether its implementation is controlled by, for example, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the purpose of which is to effect environmental protection;61 a 
resource agency, such as the Army Corps of Engineers or Forest Service, which has 
more diverse goals and traditionally has been oriented toward economic exploitation 
of natural resources;62 or an agency such as the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, which has not traditionally focused on environmental issues.63 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. See, e.g., Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(asserting claims under the federal common law of public nuisance against federal and city 
agencies for allegedly managing the Chicago Area Waterway System in a manner that will allow 
invasive carp to move into the Great Lakes, causing an ecological disaster).  
 56. But see, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 643 F.3d 311, 320−21 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(holding that an EPA guidance document was actually a legislative rule that required notice and 
comment). 
 57. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2006) (implementing the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer). 
 58. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1–1517.7 (implementing the National Environmental 
Policy Act). 
 59. See, e.g., Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 117−18 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (interpreting the language of Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7521(a)(1) (2006), in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497 (2007)). 
 60. See, e.g., In re Bell Petrol. Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
Congress intended courts to draw on “traditional and evolving common law principles” to 
determine the scope of liability under CERCLA). 
 61. Our Mission and What We Do, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and
-what-we-do (last updated June 3, 2013) (“The mission of EPA is to protect human health and 
the environment.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012) (“It is 
the policy of the Congress that the national forests are established and shall be administered for 
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.”); Water Resources 
Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, 114 Stat. 2572 (2000) (authorizing the Corps of 
Engineers to undertake projects to, among other things, reduce flood damage, improve 
navigation, upgrade hydroelectric power generating facilities, restore aquatic ecosystems, and 
enhance beach recreation). 
 63. The extent to which an agency has an environmental mission and environmental 
expertise can change significantly. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service exemplify agencies that over time have been delegated more 
environmental responsibilities and have in turn responded by increasing their environmental 
expertise. 
1250 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:1239 
 
Level of Government. Environmental laws originate at all different levels of 
government—for example, international,64 national,65 state,66 and local.67 On the 
other hand, national environmental laws sometimes implement international 
treaties,68 state environmental statutes are often modeled on federal environmental 
statutes,69 and federal environmental statutes often employ cooperative federalism 
that allows state environmental programs to implement federal statutes,70 somewhat 
undercutting the distinction between the different levels.71 
Breadth. Environmental laws vary in scope from narrowly targeted72 to 
extremely expansive.73 The breadth of an environmental law depends largely on its 
other characteristics, such as the subject matter and level of government. Breadth 
affects, in turn, the magnitude of the costs and benefits of a law and the resources 
needed to implement it. 
B. Categories of Prominence 
Having identified features that differentiate among environmental laws, we can 
move to the tasks of pinpointing those environmental laws that comprise the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. E.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 51; 
Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on 
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, 
U.S.-Mex., Aug. 14, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 1025. 
 65. See, e.g., statutes cited supra notes 1−6. 
 66. E.g., Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6020.101−.1305 
(West 2012). 
 67. See, e.g., Noise Control Ordinance of the County of Los Angeles, L.A., CAL., L.A. 
COUNTY CODE §§ 12.08.010−.680. 
 68. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2006 & Supp. 2011) (implementing the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer). 
 69. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6301–6309 (2011) (adopting hazardous waste 
management provisions similar to RCRA). 
 70. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006) (allowing EPA to 
authorize state water pollution discharge permit programs implementing the Federal Clean 
Water Act). 
 71. Robert Fischman undertook a somewhat similar analysis in a 2008 article in which 
he identified certain attributes that distinguish among environmental laws. See Fischman, 
supra note 30. Fischman distinguished pollution control versus resource management subject 
matters, categorical versus utilitarian regulatory approaches, statutory detail versus agency 
latitude, and Commerce Clause versus Property Clause constitutional authority. See id. at 
666–84. As opposed to mapping the field generally, Fischman focused on how these features 
“distinguish the two main lines of environmental law [pollution law and natural resources 
law] from each other.” Id. at 662 (emphasis in original). 
 72. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 262m-4 (2006) (supporting “the strengthening of educational 
programs within each multilateral development bank to improve the capacity of mid-level 
managers to initiate and manage environmental aspects of development activities, and to 
train officials of borrowing countries in the conduct of environmental analyses”). 
 73. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006) (“Except as in compliance with this section 
and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any 
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”). 
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environmental law canon and comparing them to other environmental laws in terms 
of the differentiating features. 
1. Environmental Law Canon 
This Subpart defines the environmental law canon, identifies those 
environmental laws that comprise the canon, and then assesses the canon in terms 
of the differentiating features discussed in Part I.A, demonstrating a strong 
commonality of certain characteristics across the canon that is not shared by the 
field of environmental law as a whole. 
Attempting to define which environmental laws comprise the canon necessitates 
first defining what we mean by the canon. “What is ‘canonical’ in law varies 
according to how the canon is defined, and how the canon is defined depends on 
the purpose of the canon.”74 In general, canon connotes a prominence and 
significance of certain items among a broader set. Beyond this commonality, canon 
has several related but different meanings in contemporary common usage.75 This 
paper uses canon in the sense of a collection of the most important items in a field. 
Important laws are not necessarily good laws, and so canon as used here is 
primarily descriptive rather than normative.76 Although there may be various ways 
of assessing the prominence and importance of laws to their legal field, which 
could in some cases lead to uncertainty and disagreement about which laws 
constitute a canon, the most obvious measures of prominence in environmental law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 963, 975 (1998). 
 75. Cf. id. at 968 n.24 (tracing the etymology and historical usage of the term). Different 
specific meanings involve different measures of significance or different types of items 
being sorted. Canon can mean a collection of the most important items in a field. See David 
Fontana, A Case for the Twenty-First Century Constitutional Canon: Schneiderman v. 
United States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 35, 90 n.10 (2002) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 198 
(7th ed. 1999)); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 825 
(2004). Canon can refer to a fundamental legal principle. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 234 
(9th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 
316 (2000); Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
1389, 1390 (2005). A canon can be an important theme or way of thinking about a field. See 
Hasday, supra, at 825; Mark Tushnet, The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law: An Introduction, 
17 CONST. COMMENT. 187, 187 (2000). Canon can mean “an authority that can be invoked in 
the face of almost any counterevidence because it is its own evidence and stronger in its 
force than any other”—that is, an authority that “stops inquiry.” Stanley Fish, Not of an Age, 
but for All Time: Canons and Postmodernism, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 12 (1993). Finally, 
canon law refers to a body of law developed within a particular religious tradition. See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (9th ed. 2009); see also, e.g., George La Piana, Book 
Review, 49 HARV. L. REV. 855, 855 (1936). 
 76. That being said, a highly beneficial law is hopefully more likely to thrive and take 
on importance than a poorly functioning law, so there probably is some correlation between 
the normative value of a law and whether it is prominent and therefore canonical. Cf. infra 
note 295 (noting that even identifying certain characteristics as salient makes an indirectly 
normative evaluation). 
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all point to a group of six federal environmental statutes that dominates the 
teaching and practice of what is generally regarded as environmental law: 
• Clean Air Act (CAA),77 the primary federal air pollution statute; 
• Clean Water Act (CWA),78 the primary federal water pollution statute; 
• Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA),79 which authorizes the cleanup of environmental 
contamination and imposes liability for such cleanups; 
• Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),80 which regulates the 
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous 
waste; 
• National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),81 which requires federal 
agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of their proposed actions; 
and  
• Endangered Species Act (ESA),82 which regulates activities that harm 
threatened or endangered species. 
As Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate, these six statutes are far more likely than other 
environmental laws to be mentioned in cases, law review articles, and casebooks: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Frequency of mention in cases by statute.83 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 78. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 82. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).  
 83. Figure 2 indicates the number of state and federal cases decided since January 1, 
2000, that mention each statute. Searches were run in the Westlaw and LexisNexis databases 
of all state and federal cases; the numbers reported are the average of the two databases. 
“NFMA” refers to the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614 
(2012). “FLPMA” refers to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1701–1787 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). “FIFRA” refers to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012). “OPA” refers to the Oil Pollution Act of 
1980, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
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Figure 3. Frequency of mention in law review articles by statute.84 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Frequency of substantial coverage in casebooks by statute.85 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. Figure 3 indicates the number of law review articles published since January 1, 
2000, that mention each statute. Searches were run in the Westlaw and LexisNexis databases 
of all U.S. and Canadian law journals; the numbers reported are the average of the two 
databases. “SDWA” refers to the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 
(2006). “Kyoto” refers to the Kyoto Protocol. “GATT” refers to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. 
 85. Figure 4 indicates the frequency with which federal environmental statutes are 
substantially covered in ten leading environmental law casebooks. See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT (3d ed. 2012); HOLLY DOREMUS, ALBERT C. LIN & RONALD 
H. ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND READINGS (6th ed. 
2012); DANIEL A. FARBER, JODY FREEMAN & ANN E. CARLSON., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (8th ed. 2010); ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY (4th ed. 2003); CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, WILLIAM F. FUNK & 
VICTOR B. FLATT, LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT (3d ed. 2010); LINDA A. MALONE 
& WILLIAM M. TABB, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2011); PETER S. 
MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1994); ROBERT V. 
PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY (6th ed. 2009); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. 
ABRAMS, ROBERT L. GRAHAM, LISA HEINZERLING, DAVID A. WIRTH & NOAH D. HALL, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY (4th ed. 2010); RICHARD L. 
REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2012). 
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These data show that when lawyers, scholars, and teachers practice, think, and 
teach about the field of environmental law, they do so primarily with reference to a 
relatively small set of common materials. Unlike other legal fields in which there 
may be a divergence among what materials are taught in law school courses, the 
materials requisite for knowledgeable participation in civic debate, and the 
materials important to legal academics,86 in the field of environmental law a 
common set of materials predominates in all three of these forums. These statutes 
comprise the environmental law canon. 
Comparing the six statutes in the environmental law canon to the various 
characteristics that differentiate among environmental laws,87 the environmental 
law canon generally shares five characteristics in common—the role of 
environmental protection, the subject matter, the form of law, the level of 
government, and the institution charged with implementation: 
• Laws in the environmental law canon are enacted primarily for the 
purpose of protecting the environment. 
• Canonical environmental laws generally—but not universally88—address 
pollution. 
• Canonical environmental laws are statutes, including the progeny of 
statutes such as administrative regulations implementing a statute or cases 
interpreting a statute or regulation. 
• Laws in the environmental law canon are national laws. 
• EPA administers most laws in the environmental law canon. 
In addition to sharing these functional attributes, the environmental law canon 
also shares a common historical pedigree. The statutes that comprise the 
environmental law canon are the product of the “Environmental Revolution”89 of 
the 1970s, which encompassed the first Earth Day,90 enactment of most of the 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson refer to these respectively as the “pedagogical 
canon,” “cultural literacy canon,” and the “academic theory canon.” Balkin & Levinson, 
supra note 74, at 975–76. 
 87. See supra Part I.A. 
 88. See infra Part I.B.2 (describing the special cases of NEPA and the Endangered 
Species Act). 
 89. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 
RUTGERS L.J. 395, 396 (1995); Denis Hayes, Environmental Law and Millennial Politics, 
25 ENVTL. L. 953, 964 (1995); Wallace E. Oates, On Environmental Federalism, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 1321, 1328 (1997); see also Doremus, supra note 7, at 717 (referring to the 
“environmental law revolution”); Fischman, supra note 7, at 720 (same); Ruhl, supra note 
7, at 1459. 
 90. See Anderson, supra note 89, at 395 (describing events during the first Earth Day 
on April 22, 1970). 
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major federal environmental statutes,91 and the creation of the EPA.92 That being 
said, only some of the federal environmental statutes Congress enacted during the 
1970s are canonical; others receive relatively meager attention in cases, casebooks, 
and law review articles.93 
The environmental law canon, as the concept is employed here, is defined and 
functions largely descriptively. But the canon has normative elements as well. 
Within the environmental community it is largely revered, even when criticized.94 
Calls for political action on environmental issues often explicitly invoke the 1970s 
as a model and inspiration,95 recognizing both the dramatic material 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012)); Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 
91 (1970) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)); National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2006 & Supp. V 2011)); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-
604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. 2011)); see 
also LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 70 (listing eighteen major federal environmental protection 
statutes enacted during the 1970s). 
 92. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970). 
 93. See, e.g., Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901–4918 (2006)). As compared with thousands of 
citations in cases and law reviews to the canonical environmental statutes, see supra Figures 2–
3, just thirty-eight cases and ninety-two law review articles since 2000 have mentioned the 
Noise Control Act.  
  Some environmental histories have criticized, to greater and lesser extents, the 
narrative of the Environmental Revolution—that is, the idea that the early 1970s represented 
the spontaneous “divine conception” of a new field of law. See, e.g., KARL BOYD BROOKS, 
BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1945–1970, at 14 
(2009). These histories have described the 1970s as a phase in the continued development of a 
body of law that long preceded the developments in the 1970s. See, e.g., id. Richard Lazarus 
has offered a more middle-ground perspective, emphasizing both the dramatic changes in the 
early 1970s and the historical antecedents to those changes. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 
49 (“The environmental statutes and institutions that emerged in the 1970s were of a very 
different magnitude than any previously existing regimes for environmental protection, but they 
reflected a logical, albeit exponential, outgrowth of decades of legal evolution on closely 
related matters.”). Regardless, all of these histories readily acknowledge the significance of the 
1970s to the construction of our current system of federal environmental statutes. See, e.g., 
BROOKS, supra, at 15 (“The rate of environmental lawmaking attained its zenith in the early 
1970s . . . .”); LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 69 (characterizing the 1970s as “a statutory and 
institutional transformation” during which “[s]eemingly every aspect of environmental 
protection and natural resource conservation was the subject of comprehensive congressional 
legislation”); Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, supra note 
32, at 486 (“No matter how environmental law’s historical taxonomy is built, it is plain that the 
1970s were ground-shifting.”). 
 94. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 253 (opining that, despite “slippage,” “regulatory 
perversities,” and “serious and persistent socioeconomic and racial inequities,” “environmental 
law has been remarkably successful”). 
 95. See, e.g., David K. Hausman, Kerry Urges Eco-Awareness, HARV. CRIMSON, Apr. 23, 
2007, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2007/4/23/kerry-urges-eco-awareness-sen-john
-kerry/ (reporting speech in which Senator John Kerry “urged a return to the environmental 
activism of the early 1970s”). 
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accomplishments of the enactments of that period and its strong idealism, which 
resonates with many environmentalists. William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have 
classified the statutes of the environmental law canon as examples of 
“superstatutes,”96 which share three features: 
[S]uperstatutes . . . (1) embod[y] a new principle or policy displacing 
common law baselines, responsive to important social or economic 
challenges facing the country; (2) [are] drafted and enacted after a 
process of publicized institutionalized deliberation responsive to the 
voices and needs of We the People; and (3) [are] stuck in the public 
culture, after a period of implementation and formal confirmation by 
Congress after further public discussion.97 
Superstatutes, although “subordinate to the Constitution,” become part of “the 
fundamental structure and values of American public policy,” “instantiat[ing] both 
social norms and legal rules.”98 Thus, according to Eskridge and Ferejohn’s 
account of superstatutes, the environmental law canon becomes the focal point not 
only of environmental law, but of environmental norms more generally. 
This points to a more subtle, and potentially pernicious, normative effect of the 
environmental law canon. The predominance of the environmental law canon in the 
field, and the strongly similar features the canon exhibits, project an image of 
environmental law that is more homogenous and narrow than the field as a whole. 
This, in turn, obscures the existence of environmental laws outside of the canon, 
and more importantly obscures the possibility of enacting environmental laws that 
do not resemble the canon.99 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. WILLIAM N ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 256, 301 
(2010) (offering the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species Act as 
examples of “superstatutes” that comprise a “green constitution”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
& John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1242–46 (2001) (discussing the 
Endangered Species Act as a “superstatute” case study); see also Jim Chen, Legal 
Mythmaking in a Time of Mass Extinctions: Reconciling Stories of Origins with Human 
Destiny, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 292 (2005) (“The National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1970 (‘NEPA’) and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (‘ESA’) head the list of 
environmental ‘super-statutes’ whose ‘institutional [and] normative’ impact reaches issues 
ordinarily addressed through Constitutional law.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Eskridge & 
Ferejohn, supra, at 1216)). 
 97. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 96, at 26. 
 98. Id. at 27, 28. 
 99. An exception to this is the federalism debate over the optimal balance between 
national and state environmental regulation, which has received ample attention. See, e.g., 
Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 130, 151 (2005); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the 
Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23 (1996); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: 
Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, 
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, 
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); Scott R. Saleska & 
Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check in the 
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2. Special Cases: ESA and NEPA 
Two canonical environmental statutes, the Endangered Species Act (ESA)100 
and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),101 present special cases. By any 
measure of prominence, the ESA and NEPA qualify as canonical. Commentators 
often describe the ESA and NEPA as among the most important environmental 
laws.102 Both the ESA and NEPA are among the most litigated environmental 
statutes, are among the most cited in law review articles, and appear in the 
leading environmental law casebooks.103 Both focus overwhelmingly on 
environmental protection.104 Both were enacted in the 1970s.105 
But the ESA and NEPA do not entirely follow the dominant pattern for the 
environmental law canon, and have some characteristics more associated with 
environmental laws outside the canon. Both statutes are often classified as 
resource statutes,106 and receive extensive coverage in natural resources law 
                                                                                                                 
Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to 
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental 
Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67 (1996). 
 100. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 102. The ESA has been called “one of the most potent environmental laws,” J.B. Ruhl & 
James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative 
State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 59 (2010), and “one of America’s 
best-known and most important environmental laws,” Reed D. Benson, Dams, Duties, and 
Discretion: Bureau of Reclamation Water Project Operations and the Endangered Species 
Act, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9 (2008). NEPA is often called the “Magna Carta” of 
environmental law. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, 18 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 201, 209 (2004); Daniel R. Mandelker, The National Environmental Policy Act: 
A Review of Its Experience and Problems, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 293, 293 (2010). 
 103. See supra Part I.B (reporting the frequency that specific environmental statutes 
appear in cases, law review articles, and environmental law casebooks). 
 104. ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are to provide a 
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species 
depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered 
species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the 
purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.”); NEPA 
§ 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (“The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which 
will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to 
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere 
and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological 
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on 
Environmental Quality.”). 
 105. Congress enacted NEPA in 1970, see National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 
Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), and the ESA in 1973, see Endangered Species Act 
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884. 
 106. See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 7, at 669, 682 (referring to NEPA and the ESA, 
respectively, as resource statutes); Alyson C. Flournoy, Heather Halter & Christina Storz, 
Harnessing the Power of Information to Protect Our Public Natural Resource Legacy, 86 TEX. 
L. REV. 1575, 1591–92 (2008) (referring to NEPA as a resource statute); Alyson C. Flournoy, 
Preserving Dynamic Systems: Wetlands, Ecology and Law, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 105, 
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casebooks.107 Neither statute focuses on pollution, and neither is primarily 
administered by EPA. The ESA is primarily administered by resource agencies—
the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s Fisheries Service108—but also places significant implementation 
responsibilities on all federal agencies.109 NEPA’s obligations attach to “all 
agencies of the Federal Government.”110 
Moreover, the nature of NEPA’s and the ESA’s requirements are such that 
implementation of those statutes becomes integrated with other, non-environmental 
law. NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare and release to the public an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before taking any major action 
“significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”111 This obligation 
attaches to agency programs as diverse as the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s funding of a housing development revitalization project,112 the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s designation of a national interest electric 
transmission corridor,113 and the Army Corps of Engineers’ construction of a 
dam.114 The Endangered Species Act prohibits the “take” of any endangered 
species115 and further requires all federal agencies, in consultation with the Fish and 
Wildlife Service or the Fisheries Service, to “insure that any action authorized, 
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued 
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the 
                                                                                                                 
107 n.12 (1996) (referring to the ESA as a resource statute); Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds 
and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 464 (1994) 
(referring to NEPA as a resource statute). Although NEPA and the ESA are often classified as 
resource statutes, they have distinctive features—for example, primary focus on environmental 
protection, broad application across the federal government—that differentiate them from the 
other resource statutes and explain their prominence and inclusion in the canon. 
 107. See, e.g., CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, FEDERICO CHEEVER & BRET C. BIRDSONG, NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 123–84, 759–823 (2005); 
JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND 
POLICY 258–92, 348–440 (2d ed. 2009).  
 108. See, e.g., ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (delegating authority to list species as 
endangered or threatened to the Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Commerce). 
 109. See, e.g., ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring “[e]ach Federal agency” 
to insure that its actions are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species or threatened species”). 
 110. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). 
 111. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Not every federal action necessitates a 
full EIS. To determine whether the environmental impacts of a proposed action will be 
significant enough to warrant a full EIS, the agency may prepare an Environmental 
Assessment. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b)–(c), 1508.9 (2011). If, based on the Environmental 
Assessment, the agency concludes that the proposed action will not significantly impact the 
environment, it will issue a Finding of No Significant Impact in lieu of an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.13 (2011). See generally Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756–58 
(2004) (providing an overview of EISs, Environmental Assessments, and Findings of No 
Significant Impact). 
 112. Coliseum Square Ass’n v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 237–38 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 113. Cal. Wilderness Coal v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1096–98 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 114. See Marsh v. Ore. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 364–67 (1989). 
 115. ESA § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
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destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat of such species.”116 These 
requirements, like NEPA, also apply to diverse circumstances, such as the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) provision of federal flood 
insurance,117 the Army’s ongoing operation of a military base,118 and the 
Department of Energy’s grant of an easement across its property for construction 
and use of a private mining road.119 
Because NEPA and the ESA are for the most part implemented by agencies that 
do not specialize in environmental law, and because NEPA and the ESA’s 
requirements apply to activities not necessarily undertaken as part of environmental 
programs, both statutes are essentially incorporated into non-environmental 
programs. For example, the application of the ESA’s “take” and “jeopardy” 
provisions to FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program essentially incorporates 
the ESA provisions into the federal flood insurance program.120 The integration of 
NEPA and ESA implementation with non-environmental programs distinguishes 
NEPA and the ESA from other statutes in the environmental canon, which are 
administered by EPA as part of its set of environmental statutes. In fact, the 
integration of NEPA and ESA implementation with non-environmental programs 
resembles a key feature of some noncanonical environmental statutes—a category I 
call embedded environmental laws—which Part II examines in detail. 
As statutes that receive widespread attention from practitioners and academics, 
but that have some distinctive features more associated with environmental laws 
outside of the canon than within it, the ESA and NEPA somewhat muddy the 
distinction between canonical and noncanonical environmental law. But the ESA’s 
and NEPA’s unusual, noncanonical features also make them potentially useful 
vehicles for understanding how the distinctive features of noncanonical 
environmental law operate.121 Moreover, the noncanonical characteristics of NEPA 
and the ESA enable both statutes to work synergistically in support of noncanonical 
environmental provisions.122 
3. Subcanonical Environmental Law 
Outside of the core environmental law canon lie other sets of environmental 
laws that have some, but not all, of the features of canonical environmental law and 
a correspondingly diminished prominence in the field—well below the importance 
of the statutes in the canon, but still more important than other categories of 
noncanonical environmental law. Some of these subcanonical environmental laws 
have important links with canonical environmental laws. 
Resource Statutes. Outside of the canon of federal statutes enacted primarily to 
protect the natural environment, the set of laws most closely associated with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 117. See Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1141–44 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
the ESA § 7 applies to FEMA’s administration of the National Flood Insurance Program). 
 118. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (D. Ariz. 2002). 
 119. Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1190 (D. Colo. 2002). 
 120. See Fla. Key Deer, 522 F.3d at 1141–44. 
 121. See infra Part II. 
 122. See infra notes 231–32 and accompanying text. 
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environmental law are the federal natural resource statutes. They receive significant 
attention in case law, in law school curricula, and in legal scholarship—although to 
a lesser extent than the pollution statutes and with a disproportionate emphasis in 
the West.123 Resource statutes share several characteristics that distinguish them 
from statutes in the environmental law canon. Resource statutes are mixed-motive 
environmental laws that, although they include a goal of conserving and preserving 
elements of the natural environment,124 also intentionally facilitate the exploitation 
of natural resources.125 Their subject matter is natural resources rather than 
pollution, and they are administered by resource agencies rather than by EPA.126 
Resource agencies are staffed and operate very differently than EPA, and even 
operate under different constitutional authority.127 
Other Federal Pollution Statutes. Not all federal pollution statutes fall within 
the environmental law canon. EPA administers other statutes lacking the 
prominence of the major pollution statutes that comprise the environmental law 
canon. Some of these EPA statutes, such as the Safe Drinking Water Act,128 have 
the requisite features of the statutes in the canon but are much smaller programs by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. In fact, the importance of publicly owned natural resources in rural areas of the West 
may give the resource statutes more prominence than the canonical pollution statutes in such 
areas. 
 124. See, e.g., Federal Lands Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) § 202(c)(3), 
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(3) (2006) (instructing the Secretary of the Interior, in the management 
of public lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management, to “give priority to the 
designation and protection of areas of critical environmental concern”). Clean Water Act 
§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006), which regulates the placement of dredge and fill material in 
waters of the United States, presents an interesting question of classification. Although the 
Clean Water Act overall is a canonical pollution statute, the dredge-and-fill program under 
section 404 is often viewed instead as a wetlands protection provision more associated with 
natural resources law. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. GABA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 88 (4th ed. 2009) 
(observing that section 404 “is typically not addressed in detail in environmental law 
casebooks”); Oliver A. Houck, Retaking the Exam: How Environmental Law Failed New 
Orleans and the Gulf Coast South and How It Might Yet Succeed, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1059, 
1070 (2007) (“Originally seen as a pollution control program, section 404 quickly became a 
wetlands-development control program as well . . . .”). 
 125. See, e.g., FLPMA § 202(c)(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1) (instructing the Secretary of 
the Interior, in the management of the same public lands, to “observe the principles of 
multiple use and sustained yield,” which are defined to include the potential extraction of 
timber and minerals); see also LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 178 (“Natural resources laws 
historically equated the public interest with the economic exploitation and development of 
natural resources, although resource conservation and ‘public trust doctrine’ principles had 
emerged as a significant counterweight by the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries . . . .”). 
 126. See, e.g., National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1–18f-3 (2012) 
(administered by the National Park Service); National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614 (administered by the Forest Service); Federal Lands Policy and 
Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (administered 
by the Bureau of Land Management). 
 127. EPA statutes operate largely under the authority of the Commerce Clause; natural 
resource statutes operate largely under the authority of the Property Clause. 
 128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
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virtue of their narrower scope. Others aim at somewhat different objectives. The 
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)129 and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),130 for example, address human health and environmental 
hazards throughout the life cycle of a substance rather than just when a substance is 
released into the environment. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act (EPCRA or EPCRTKA)131 addresses emergency planning and reporting 
of inventories and releases of hazardous chemicals. 
State Law Analogues. Although the environmental law canon is decidedly 
federal—for example, no major environmental law casebook examines state 
environmental laws in detail—some state environmental statutes are functionally 
close to the canon. State environmental statutes are often modeled on federal 
environmental statutes.132 Many times this modeling arises because federal 
environmental statutes, through what is known as cooperative federalism or 
“delegated program federalism,”133 allow state environmental programs to 
implement federal statutes.134 To some extent, this relationship emphasizes and 
inflates the primacy of federal environmental law, because state environmental 
laws developed under cooperative federalism usually closely resemble the federal 
environmental laws they implement.135 But the role of states in cooperative 
federalism regimes also gives states a degree of power in setting federal policy, 
because EPA sometimes lacks the capacity to supersede state programs and 
accordingly must defer to state programs even when they diverge from the 
supposedly minimum federal standard.136 Even state statutes modeled on federal 
statutes may give states increased authority that federal agencies lack under their 
statutes. Washington’s cleanup statute, for example, includes petroleum and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (2012). 
 130. 7 U.S.C. §§136–136y (2012). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2006). 
 132. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6301–6309 (2011) (adopting hazardous waste 
management provisions similar to RCRA); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11–/13.7 (West 
2011 & Supp. 2013) (adopting water pollution provisions similar to the Clean Water Act and 
Safe Drinking Water Act). 
 133. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1276 (2009) (“Since the 1970s, states have implemented and enforced 
most of the United States’s major environmental statutes.”); William W. Buzbee, 
Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1547, 1565 (2007) (noting that federal environmental statutes often allow state 
governments to assume implementation and enforcement of a program if state laws are at 
least as stringent as federal requirements). 
 134. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006) (allowing EPA to 
authorize state water pollution discharge permit programs implementing the Federal Clean 
Water Act). 
 135. Compare, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-5301.01 (LexisNexis 2008) (prohibiting 
the use of lead pipes, plumbing fixtures, solder, or flux in public water systems or plumbing 
that provides water for human consumption), with Safe Drinking Water Act § 1417(a)(1)(A), 
42 U.S.C. § 300g-6(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (same). 
 136. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 133, at 1276–77 (citing John P. Dwyer, 
The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995)). 
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petroleum products that CERCLA specifically excludes.137 Pennsylvania’s Clean 
Streams Law similarly covers more water bodies than the Federal Clean Water 
Act.138 
Common Law. The common law also occupies a special place in environmental 
law, in some ways like certain state environmental laws—outside the canon but 
also closely intertwined with it. Common law doctrines that address environmental 
problems share few features in common with canonical environmental laws. 
Common law has a primarily remedial purpose, whereas environmental regulation 
has a regulatory purpose.139 Common law doctrines employ different regulatory 
mechanisms than statutes; common law imposes liability for the harm conduct 
causes, whereas statutes generally prohibit certain conduct, without a showing of 
individualized harm. Common law doctrines are judge-made and administered by 
courts through largely private litigation; statutes are enacted by legislatures and 
administered by administrative agencies. Common law doctrines are primarily 
state, rather than federal, law. The differences between environmental statutes and 
common law are in part quite deliberate. Modern environmental statutes were 
enacted in part because of the perceived inadequacy of common law doctrines to 
protect the environment.140 But common law doctrines are also not entirely separate 
from environmental statutes—for example, courts often construe undefined 
statutory terms according to their meaning in the common law,141 and statutory 
requirements may help to define common law liability.142 
International Environmental Treaties. International environmental treaties lie at 
the intersection of the fields of environmental law and international law and form 
the foundation of international environmental law, a subfield of both fields. Some 
treaties have generated implementing legislation that shows up in the 
environmental law canon, such as the provisions of the Clean Air Act that 
implement the Montreal Protocol.143 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. Compare CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2006) (stating that hazardous 
substance “does not include petroleum”), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105D.020(10)(d) 
(West 2011) (defining hazardous substance to include “[p]etroleum or petroleum products”). 
 138. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2013) (tying the definition of “waters of the United 
States” covered by the Clean Water Act to the waters’ effect on foreign and interstate 
commerce), with 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 691.1 (West 2003) (defining “Waters of the 
Commonwealth” covered by the Clean Streams Law “to include any and all . . . bodies or 
channels of conveyance of surface and underground water, or parts thereof, whether natural 
or artificial, within or on the boundaries of this Commonwealth”). 
 139. PLATER ET AL., supra note 85, at 74. 
 140. See Percival, supra note 7, at 160 (noting that the major environmental statutes 
enacted in the 1970s were in part “adopted in response to perceived inadequacies of the 
common law”). 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 277 F.3d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 2001) (construing 
the Lacey Act by inquiring “whether Congress used terms which have a specific common-
law meaning”). 
 142. See, e.g., Gearhardt v. Am. Reinforced Paper Co., 244 F.2d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 1957) 
(affirming judgment for plaintiff where defendant negligently caused a fire that damaged 
plaintiff’s property in violation of Illinois state law). 
 143. See Clean Air Act §§ 601–618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
2014] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON 1263 
 
4. Noncanonical Environmental Law 
Outside of the categories of canonical and subcanonical environmental laws, 
there are other environmental laws that lie clearly apart from the canon of the field, 
both in terms of their relative obscurity within environmental law and differences 
in their characteristic features. 
Some of these categories of noncanonical environmental law exhibit multiple 
features that separate them from the environmental law canon. For example, state 
natural resources statutes,144 which tend to receive meager attention, are neither 
pollution statutes nor federal laws. Noncanonical environmental law also includes 
private law that addresses environmental concerns, such as a lease term that seeks 
to prevent the lessee from causing environmental contamination on the lessor’s 
property.145 
Other categories of noncanonical environmental law, such as local land use law, 
are recognized independent legal fields. These related fields overlap incompletely 
with environmental law, in that some but not all of the laws within the field address 
environmental concerns. Such related fields have their own independent casebooks, 
scholarship, and doctrine.146 Energy law provides an interesting example of a 
related field that may once have fit within the category of noncanonical 
environmental law, or perhaps not environmental law at all, but has arguably 
ascended to at least the category of subcanonical environmental law by virtue of 
energy law’s increasing focus on environmental concerns and the increased 
appreciation of its important relationship to environmental issues such as air 
pollution and climate change. 
Apart from related legal fields, other noncanonical environmental laws take the 
form of environmental provisions contained within a statute not primarily aimed at 
regulating environmental impacts, or environmental statutes contained within a 
larger non-environmental program. I collectively refer to these categories as 
embedded environmental law, reflecting the incorporation of environmental 
provisions or statutes into broader non-environmental statutes or programs.147 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 9-13-1 to -274 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2012) state-owned 
forests); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 49-29-10 to -230 (2008 & Supp. 2012) (state scenic rivers). 
 145. See, e.g., Heather Hughes, Securitization and Suburbia, 90 OR. L. REV. 359, 369 
n.23 (2011) (contending that “private ordering [is] central to the concerns of environmental 
law”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 
2033 (2005) (arguing that “second-order agreements” among private actors create incentives 
that affect the implementation of public law regulation). 
 146. See, e.g., ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSÉ A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATION FOR 
REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS (1993); DANIEL R. 
MANDELKER, CAROL NECOLE BROWN, STUART MECK, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM, PETER W. 
SALSICH, JR., NANCY E. STROUD & JULIE A. TAPPENDORF, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND 
DEVELOPMENT (8th ed. 2011). 
 147. Embedded environmental laws differ from legal fields or concepts that merely 
overlap in application with environmental law. Bankruptcy law, for example, often applies in 
circumstances in which environmental law also applies. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs. 
v. Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993) (addressing whether claim against business owners 
for costs of cleanup of hazardous waste at their former business property was discharged in 
their bankruptcy); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984) 
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Embedded environmental law—including its distinctive features and importance to 
the broader project of environmental law—is the focus of Part II. 
II. EMBEDDED ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Embedded environmental laws, a subspecies of noncanonical environmental 
law, are contained within a statute or program that is not primarily aimed at 
regulating environmental impacts and usually are administered by an agency that 
does not specialize in environmental issues. Essentially, embedded environmental 
laws are environmental laws organized with other, non-environmental laws. 
Embedded environmental laws thus lie within overlapping legal fields—both 
environmental law and whatever field they are embedded within. 
Embedded environmental laws have heretofore been overlooked, both 
individually and collectively, as a category of functionally distinct environmental 
law. To a certain extent their obscurity is understandable. Embedded environmental 
laws do not compare to the environmental law canon in terms of size or 
prominence; they do not belong in the canon. Embedded environmental laws are 
hidden away in the law generally, isolated both substantively and institutionally 
from other environmental laws. Many of them are relatively minor provisions with 
uncertain environmental impacts or even an uncertain relationship to environmental 
concerns. But it is a mistake to ignore embedded environmental laws, in part 
precisely because they differ so much from the environmental law canon, for their 
differences create the basis for an alternative model of environmental lawmaking. 
Embedded environmental laws have the potential to play an increasing and 
constructive role in the future of environmental law. 
This Part examines embedded environmental laws as a discrete and largely 
ignored category of environmental law. Part II.A identifies four different types of 
embedded environmental laws, adding clarity to the definition of the category. Part 
II.B then explores how the features identified in Part I.C, which differentiate among 
environmental laws, are manifested in embedded environmental law. Part II.C 
examines the implications of those features for how embedded environmental laws 
function as compared with the environmental law canon. Finally, Part II.D argues 
that embedded environmental law is an alternative and parallel system that can 
complement and substitute for canonical environmental law, helping environmental 
law to address some of its major challenges. 
A. Types 
Because statutes are not necessarily codified by the same method of 
organization as they are enacted, environmental laws can be embedded at creation 
only, at implementation only, or at both creation and implementation: 
                                                                                                                 
(addressing whether Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay precluded state agency from 
enforcing injunction against bankruptcy debtor to correct violations of various state 
environmental protection statutes). This overlap poses interesting and important questions 
for the application of both legal fields, see, e.g., Jason S. Brookner, Environmental Claims in 
Bankruptcy: An Overview, 112 BANKING L.J. 124 (1995); Stanley M. Spracker & James D. 
Barnette, The Treatment of Environmental Matters in Bankruptcy Cases, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 
85 (1995), but does not by itself transform bankruptcy laws into environmental laws. 
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• An environmental law is embedded only at creation if it is enacted as part 
of a non-environmental statute but administered with an environmental 
statute or program. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005,148 which 
overall was not an environmental law, included provisions amending the 
Clean Air Act with respect to regulation of renewable fuels.149 
• An environmental law is embedded only at implementation if it is enacted 
as part of an environmental statute but administered with a non-
environmental statute or program. For example, the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990150 amended the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970151 to require the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to 
issue “a chemical process safety standard designed to protect employees 
from hazards associated with accidental releases of highly hazardous 
chemicals in the workplace.”152 
• An environmental law is embedded at both creation and implementation if 
it is enacted as part of a non-environmental statute and codified and 
administered with a non-environmental statute or program. For example, 
section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, which 
restricts the use of certain parklands and historic areas for federal 
transportation projects, was enacted and is codified as part of the 
Department of Transportation’s enabling statute.153 
This Part’s examination of embedded environmental laws will focus on those 
embedded at both creation and implementation, because those laws most 
thoroughly exhibit the distinctive characteristics of embedded environmental laws 
and stand in sharpest contrast with canonical environmental statutes. Its 
observations and conclusions about laws embedded at both creation and 
implementation apply in part, however, to the functioning of environmental laws 
embedded only at creation (and not implementation) or only at implementation. 
Such partially embedded environmental laws function as a hybrid of characteristics 
associated with conventional environmental laws and characteristics associated 
with fully embedded environmental laws. For example, take the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005’s amendments to the Clean Air Act,154 embedded at creation but not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594. 
 149. Id. § 1501, 119 Stat. at 1067–76 (amending Clean Air Act § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545). 
 150. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. 
 151. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 152. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 304(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655. 
 153. Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 303 (2006)); see also, e.g., Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (AAIA), 49 U.S.C. § 
47106(c)(1)(B) (2006) (requiring Federal Aviation Administration to take “every reasonable step” 
to avoid approving airport runway development projects that will have “a significant adverse 
effect on natural resources”); Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, § 
3(b), 100 Stat. 1243, 1243–44 (amending Federal Power Act § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1), to 
add “the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife (including related 
spawning grounds and habitat)” to the required elements of any hydropower licenses approved by 
the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission)). 
 154. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1501, 119 Stat. at 1067–76 (amending Clean Air Act 
§ 211). 
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implementation: enacting the amendments as part of an energy bill, rather than as 
part of a statute focused on the Clean Air Act, likely affected the politics of the 
legislation.155 On the other hand, once EPA incorporated the amendments into the 
Agency’s ongoing Clean Air Act programs, the amendments essentially became 
part of the environmental law canon. Depending on the objectives and the 
circumstances, hybridity may pose an advantage or a disadvantage. 
B. Features 
Embedded environmental laws have distinctive features in common that help 
both to define the category and to distinguish it from other environmental laws. 
Embedded environmental laws are thus more than just examples of environmental 
laws outside of the canon; they are their own coherent category. 
Implementing Institution. Whereas most statutes within the environmental law 
canon are administered by EPA, and many of the subcanonical resource statutes are 
administered by resource agencies with significant environmental experience and 
expertise, embedded environmental laws are often administered by agencies that 
are not primarily environmental, such as the Internal Revenue Service’s 
administration of an excise tax on ozone-depleting substances,156 the Department of 
Transportation’s administration of section 4(f) of its organic act,157 or the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission’s administration of section 10(a) of the Federal 
Power Act, requiring hydropower licenses to provide “adequate protection, 
mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife.”158 
Role of Environmental Protection. As one gets further away from the 
environmental law canon, the role of the environment in environmental laws tends 
to get murkier and less prominent. The environment, to the extent it is a focus at all, 
lacks the claims of primacy that it enjoys in the environmental law canon. For 
example, the excise tax on ozone-depleting substances was enacted both to protect 
the stratospheric ozone layer and to raise revenue.159 The Plant Protection Act,160 
which aims to control the spread of plant pests and noxious weeds, mentions 
environmental concerns among its statutory objectives but seems primarily oriented 
toward protecting the agriculture sector.161 Similarly, the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act,162 among its various provisions, states six requirements for tribal 
gaming ordinances for class II gaming under the statute; one of those six 
requirements provides that the gaming must be “conducted in a manner which 
adequately protects the environment and the public health and safety.”163 This 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. See infra Part II.C.3 (examining the political characteristics of embedded 
environmental laws). 
 156. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681–4682 (2006). 
 157. Department of Transportation Act § 4(f), 80 Stat. at 934 (codified as amended at 49 
U.S.C. § 303). 
 158. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (2012). 
 159. See infra note 223 (describing the history of the tax). 
 160. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786 (2012). 
 161. See id. § 7701 (setting forth congressional findings). 
 162. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2006). 
 163. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(E). 
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isolated environmental provision is buried within a statute focused generally on 
gaming’s ability to promote tribal economic development and concerns about 
potentially corrupting influences such as organized crime.164 Indeed, for many 
embedded environmental laws, even the environmental-ness of the law at all is 
unclear.165 
Subject Matter and Media. Consistent with the predominance of the 
environmental law canon, when Congress addresses an environmental problem 
involving a subject matter or media similar to existing canonical environmental 
law, Congress tends to utilize the environmental law canon, using existing 
regulatory mechanisms implemented by agencies specializing in environmental 
regulation. Thus, for example, Congress addressed anthropogenic depletion of the 
stratospheric ozone through the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which 
directed EPA to regulate ozone-depleting substances under the Clean Air Act.166 
Congress tends to enact embedded environmental laws, on the other hand, to 
address more novel environmental problems—for example, the invasive plant 
species regulated under the Plant Protection Act, airport noise regulated under the 
Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979,167 or marketing of organically 
produced products regulated under the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990.168 
Breadth. Given their relative obscurity, it is not surprising that embedded 
environmental laws are smaller and narrower programs than the canonical 
environmental statutes. One of the ways in which embedded environmental laws 
are narrow, however, has important functional implications: many embedded 
environmental laws target a specific sector—for example, environmental provisions 
of the Food Security Act of 1985,169 which targets agriculture; section 10(a) of the 
Federal Power Act, which targets hydropower;170 and section 4(f) of the 
Department of Transportation Act, which targets transportation.171 Sector-specific 
environmental laws are more readily embedded into other non-environmental 
programs because many non-environmental government programs are sector 
specific and are administered by sector-specific institutions such as the Department 
of Agriculture, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Department of 
Transportation. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. See, e.g., id. § 2702. 
 165. See infra Part III.C. 
 166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 167. Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94 Stat. 50 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 47501–
47510 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013)). 
 168. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6522 (2012). 
 169. Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354. The Food Security Act (FSA) contains two 
environmental provisions—known as Sodbuster, FSA §§ 1211–1213, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811–
3813 (2012), and Swampbuster, FSA §§ 1221–1223, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821–3823—that 
condition farmers’ eligibility for many federal farm program benefits on minimum standards 
of protection for certain environmentally sensitive lands. Sodbuster denies eligibility to 
farmers who convert highly erodible land to crop production without an approved soil 
conservation system. 16 U.S.C. § 3811. Swampbuster denies eligibility to farmers who 
convert a wetland to crop production. 16 U.S.C. § 3821. 
 170. 16 U.S.C. § 803. 
 171. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2006). 
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Despite these patterns, to a significant extent a defining characteristic of 
embedded environmental laws is their diversity of features. Embedded 
environmental laws are not constrained by the comparatively homogenous model 
of the environmental law canon. In addition to addressing different types of subject 
matter and media, with different roles for environmental protection, and 
administered by different agencies than the environmental law canon, embedded 
environmental laws employ a broader variety of regulatory mechanisms, including 
taxes,172 incentives,173 and planning requirements,174 as well as more conventional 
regulation.175 
C. Implications 
Canonical environmental law is integrated with other environmental law. For 
example, a federal regulation restricting air pollutant emissions from a power 
plant176 is integrated with other federal air pollution regulation—administered by 
the same subagency (EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation), as part of the same 
statutory program (Clean Air Act). Canonical environmental law is segregated, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681–4682 (2006).  
 173. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811–3813. 
 174. 49 U.S.C. § 303. 
 175. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5128 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). As previously mentioned, see 
supra Part I.B.2, there are interesting parallels between the implementation of NEPA and the 
ESA and the implementation of embedded environmental laws. Like the administration of 
embedded environmental laws, NEPA analyses and ESA consultations are often undertaken 
by agencies that are not environmental specialists. See, e.g., Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 
F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying section 7 of the ESA to Federal Emergency 
Management Agency); Am. Bird Conservancy, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.3d 1027, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (per curiam) (applying NEPA to Federal Communications Commission); Soc’y Hill 
Towers Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying NEPA to 
Department of Housing and Urban Development). Agencies apply NEPA and the ESA in 
conjunction with their administration of other non-environmental statutes, see, e.g., Fla. Key 
Deer, 522 F.3d at 1141–44 (applying section 7 of the ESA to the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s implementation of the National Flood Insurance Act); Am. Bird 
Conservancy, 516 F.3d at 1032–34 (applying NEPA to Federal Communications 
Commission implementation of the Communications Act of 1934); Soc’y Hill Towers 
Owners’ Ass’n, 210 F.3d at 173 (applying NEPA to Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s implementation of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974), 
just as agencies often apply embedded environmental laws in conjunction with their 
administration of broader non-environmental programs. For example, the Department of 
Transportation implements section 4(f)’s environmental requirements in conjunction with its 
broader administration of transportation funding under the Department of Transportation 
Act, see, e.g., Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 42 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(per curiam), and the Department of Agriculture implements Swampbuster’s environmental 
requirements in conjunction with its broader administration of farm subsidy programs, see, 
e.g., Gunn v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 118 F.3d 1233 (8th Cir. 1997). In both types of situations, 
the presence of the environmental law—NEPA, the ESA, or an embedded environmental 
statute—integrates environmental concerns with other policy objectives. 
 176. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.40Da–.52Da (2013) (setting forth Standards of 
Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units). 
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however, from non-environmental law—the same federal regulation restricting air 
pollutant emissions from a power plant is not integrated, for example, with labor 
standards177 that apply to the power plant. 
Embedded environmental law, on the other hand, is segregated from 
environmental law but integrated with some body of non-environmental law with 
which it shares other attributes. For example, section 4(f) is integrated with 
transportation programs in the Department of Transportation but segregated from 
programs that apply to parklands.178 
Comparing embedded environmental laws and the environmental law canon 
thus implicates questions about how to organize the law—in essence, comparing 
how a particular environmental provision would function as part of a broader 
environmental statute administered by an agency specializing in environmental 
policy, with how it would function as part of a program focused on the regulated 
activity.179 One way to think about how law should be organized in its enactment 
and administration is in terms of complementarities of function, which can be used 
to decide whether functions should be coordinated or administered 
independently.180 Where functions are complementary, there are likely to be 
benefits from coordinating those functions.181 Embedded environmental law offers 
the possibility that, in a particular situation, there may be greater complementarity 
of function among certain environmental and non-environmental provisions that 
govern the same activity than among environmental provisions that govern a 
particular type of environmental harm. 
Lawmakers producing environmental law choose—whether deliberately or 
inadvertently—what form the law should take. In choosing whether to address an 
environmental problem by adding a new provision modeled on the environmental 
                                                                                                                 
 
 177. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.1–.60 (2013) (regulating wage payments under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938). 
 178. In this respect, NEPA and the ESA operate differently than other statutes in the 
environmental law canon. See supra Part I.B.2. Because much of the responsibility for 
implementing NEPA and, albeit to a lesser extent, the ESA rests with non-environmental 
agencies implementing what are otherwise non-environmental programs, see supra notes 
109–10 and accompanying text, the administration of NEPA and the ESA resembles the 
administration of an embedded environmental law. When NEPA requires the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to prepare an Environmental Assessment before 
approving a housing redevelopment project, for example, it is as if NEPA has been 
embedded in HUD’s housing program. This is not just a question of overlapping application, 
as it would be with a Clean Water Act requirement that applied to the housing project. 
NEPA integrates into HUD’s program, actually becoming part of the Agency’s process for 
approving the housing project. 
 179. Cf. Eric Biber, The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of 
Administrative Law Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 79 (2012), http://
www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol125_biber.pdf (“A key question is whether you 
want to manage the externality-causing activity separately from the externality, or together.”). 
 180. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 988–97 (2004). 
 181. Id. Assessing functional complementarity with any specificity, however, can be very 
difficult. Id. at 997. 
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law canon or by enacting a new embedded environmental provision, lawmakers 
should carefully consider the implications of the differences between the two. 
The remainder of this Subpart compares how the differences in the features of 
canonical and embedded environmental laws affect the ways in which they function 
legally, institutionally, and politically. The purpose of this functional comparison is 
not to claim that embedded environmental law is categorically superior to canonical 
environmental law, or vice versa. Rather, the specific context in which a law 
applies determines whether a particular functional characteristic poses an advantage 
or disadvantage. 
1. Legal Functions 
Ideally, laws would exhibit an attribute of comprehensive and complete 
coherence—that is, perfect coherence across all possible axes of comparison. A 
federal statute regulating air pollutant emissions from coal-fired power plants, for 
example, ideally would be entirely coherent with other federal air pollution 
regulation, with other federal environmental regulation, with other federal non-
environmental regulation of power plants and of the electricity they generate, and 
with state and local environmental and non-environmental regulation of power 
plants. Without such coherence, laws can work inefficiently, operate at cross-
purposes, or even conflict. 
Purposeful coherence, however, is costly to attain. It requires coordination—
potentially, coordination at every stage of the legal process: during the enactment 
of the legislation, during the agency proceedings to implement the legislation, and 
during the enforcement process. Comprehensive and complete coherence across the 
entire web of interrelated laws is infeasible. Realistically, then, coherence will be 
limited at best, and lawmakers face a tradeoff in deciding what coherence to 
prioritize. 
The way the law is organized increases the salience of certain of its 
characteristics, thereby facilitating the coherence of laws that share those 
characteristics. A massive environmental statute such as the Clean Air Act may be 
sprawling, complex, and far from comprehensively coherent, but it exhibits certain 
discernible internal patterns. Accordingly, a regulatory provision within the Clean 
Air Act is more likely to be coherent with other provisions of the Act than with a 
provision of another statute. Similarly, a provision of a Farm Bill is more likely to 
be coherent with another provision of the Farm Bill than with the Clean Water Act. 
The relative merit of creating a new environmental provision as part of an 
environmental statute or by embedding it in a non-environmental statute thus 
depends in significant part on whether greater value arises from coherence with 
other environmental laws or coherence with other non-environmental laws that 
address the same conduct. Canonical environmental law—environmental law 
organized with other environmental law—is more likely to produce internal 
coherence and consistency within the field of environmental law. Embedded 
environmental law—environmental law organized with other non-environmental 
law—is more likely to generate coherence and consistency in the law of the field in 
which it is embedded. 
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The benefits of coherence, moreover, likely increase as the concentration of 
regulation in the sector increases.182 Thus, in ascertaining whether a new 
environmental policy would function better if enacted within existing 
environmental programs (canonical environmental law) or with other non-
environmental programs targeting the same industry (embedded environmental 
law), policymakers should compare the relative intensity of regulation in each 
sphere, all else equal favoring placement of the new law in the more intense sphere, 
at what one might call the regulatory center of gravity. 
Thus, it makes sense to regulate corporate disclosure of environmental liabilities 
as part of a program regulating corporate disclosures rather than as part of a 
program focusing on environmental liabilities.183 Existing securities laws 
intensively regulate other, non–environmentally related corporate disclosures.184 
On the other hand, although environmental regulatory programs such as CERCLA 
create environmental liabilities, they do not generally regulate the disclosure of 
such liabilities. The center of regulatory gravity for corporate disclosure of 
environmental liability, and accordingly the likely greatest benefit from coherence, 
is located within the programs regulating corporate disclosures (embedded 
environmental law) rather than within environmental regulatory programs 
(canonical environmental law). 
In weighing the relative merits of organizing new environmental law within 
existing environmental programs or separate from those existing programs, the 
relative conduciveness of each form to innovation may be an important 
consideration. In particular, coherence with existing law can be a drag on 
innovation. By its very nature, coherence pushes in the direction of conformity 
rather than diversity. The framework of existing statutes therefore constrains 
options for regulatory innovation within those programs.185 Even statutory 
amendments usually accomplish only incremental change.186 Thus, addressing an 
environmental problem by making changes within the environmental law canon 
will likely result in a new environmental law that looks more like existing 
environmental law than if the problem is addressed by enacting a new provision of 
embedded environmental law, separate from the extant canon. Embedded 
environmental law, less burdened by the need to conform to existing environmental 
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. On the other hand, the costs of coordination also substantially increase as the 
intensity of regulation increases—the more there is to coordinate, the more difficult it is to 
coordinate. 
 183. See, e.g., Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 
Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241). See generally 
John W. Bagby, Paula C. Murray & Eric T. Andrews, How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: 
Corporate Liability and Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 225 (1995). 
 184. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2013). 
 185. See Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The 
Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457, 480 (1996) (“[A] truly new 
regulatory system cannot be implemented within the existing legal framework . . . .”). 
 186. Even the massive and dramatic Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, which significantly revamped the Clean Air Act and were many 
times longer than the original Clean Air Act of 1970, for the most part added new elements 
to existing programs and did not replace the existing statutory programs. 
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programs, provides a structure more conducive to experimentation and policy 
innovation than canonical environmental statutes. 
Another important consideration is the organization of the field into which the 
environmental provision is embedded. Just as environmental law has its own 
internal organization,187 other fields do as well, probably including some 
hierarchical order of prominence. The effectiveness of an environmental provision 
embedded into another field likely depends on how the environmental provision 
integrates with the field. To the extent the other field has canonical statutes with 
heightened salience within that field, and concomitant higher levels of attention and 
resources, an environmental provision embedded within one of those canonical 
statutes would likely be more efficacious than if it were embedded in a less 
prominent statute. The effects of the Swampbuster provision of the Food Security 
Act and of section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act are enhanced, for 
example, because the Food Security Act—a Farm Bill—and the Department of 
Transportation Act are canonical within their respective fields of agricultural law 
and transportation law. On the other hand, precisely because of the salience of a 
canonical statute within its field, it may be politically more difficult to embed an 
environmental provision in a canonical statute of another field than in a statute that 
is more obscure to the field. 
2. Institutional Functions 
Embedded environmental law also differs fundamentally from the 
environmental law canon because the agencies that administer embedded 
environmental laws differ from EPA. EPA is the acknowledged environmental 
expert and specialist in the Executive Branch. The Agency’s mission focuses on 
environmental protection.188 Even for programs that Congress delegates to another 
agency, as to issues that implicate environmental concerns, Congress often directs 
the implementing agency to coordinate with EPA.189 EPA has accumulated a staff 
of thousands of environmental experts with which no other federal agency can 
compete.190 
Embedded environmental law thus poses institutional challenges, because it puts 
environmental lawmaking in the hands of administrative agencies that lack 
experience and expertise—and perhaps motivation as well—in addressing 
environmental protection. For many agencies, environmental protection is a 
secondary goal, and is potentially perceived to be at odds with the agency’s other, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 187. See supra Part I.B. 
 188. Our Mission and What We Do, supra note 61 (“The mission of EPA is to protect 
human health and the environment.”). 
 189. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 349 (2006) (directing the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to consult with EPA after it has issued a new drinking water regulation under the 
Safe Drinking Water Act regarding whether to promulgate regulations applying the EPA 
regulation to bottled drinking water). 
 190. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA, REP. NO. 11-P-0136, EPA NEEDS BETTER 
AGENCY-WIDE CONTROLS OVER STAFF RESOURCES 1 (2011) (reporting that the Agency 
employed somewhat over 18,000 people during fiscal years 2006–2010). 
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primary goals.191 Based on these factors, it might seem that delegating an 
environmental program to an agency other than EPA would invariably pose a 
disadvantage to the effectiveness of the program. 
But EPA is far from perfect. It is already overburdened with existing statutory 
mandates.192 It is highly bureaucratic in ways that may impair its ability to respond 
with speed and agility to new policy challenges.193 Violent swings of the political 
pendulum have left the agency with what William Ruckelshaus, its first 
Administrator, has called “battered agency syndrome.”194 EPA also has 
traditionally concentrated on pollution and public health; the agency may have less 
institutional advantage in addressing environmental problems that lie outside of 
these realms. 
Moreover, despite their relative lack of expertise on environmental issues, non-
environmental agencies may better understand the non-environmental dimensions 
of a problem. Drawing again on the example of corporate disclosures of 
environmental liabilities,195 the SEC may not have EPA’s deep expertise on issues 
of environmental liability, but it has much stronger experience than EPA on issues 
of corporate disclosure, and that expertise may be more relevant than 
environmental expertise to the overall success of corporate disclosures of 
environmental liabilities. 
Other agencies also may be more willing and able to depart from the 
environmental law canon’s paradigm that dominates EPA. Agencies are notorious 
for their predilection toward the status quo and against dramatic change.196 
Delegating a new environmental program to EPA, an agency with an existing 
heavy environmental docket, is thus likely to result in a new program that strongly 
resembles existing EPA programs. Delegating a new environmental program to an 
agency such as the Department of Agriculture, which focuses far less on 
environmental regulation, puts the agency in a position of writing policy on a 
relatively cleaner slate. At the very least, the institutional tendencies of a non-
environmental agency such as the Department of Agriculture are likely to be based 
on its existing programs that differ significantly from the environmental law canon. 
The Swampbuster provision of the Food Security Act, for example, has features 
                                                                                                                 
 
 191. See Todd S. Aagaard, A Functional Approach to Risks and Uncertainties Under 
NEPA, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87, 115 (2012); cf. Eric Biber, Too Many Things to 
Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 6–30 (2009) (describing the tendency of multiple-goal agencies to focus on certain 
primary goals at the expense of secondary goals). 
 192. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integration & Biocomplexity, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1191, 
1233 (2001) (referring to EPA Administrator as “harassed and overburdened”); William D. 
Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 25, 26 (“Any senior 
EPA official will tell you that the agency has the resources to do not much more than ten 
percent of the things Congress has charged it to do.”). 
 193. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. 31174 (Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen. Baucus) 
(criticizing “EPA’s bloated bureaucratic process”). 
 194. Ruckelshaus, supra note 192, at 25. 
 195. See supra notes 183–84 and accompanying text. 
 196. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2263 
(2001) (noting bureaucracies’ tendency toward “inertia and torpor”). 
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consistent with existing agriculture programs built around subsidy programs but 
functions quite differently from the Clean Water Act’s wetlands program.197 
The prospect of dispersing environmental programs across agencies throughout 
the federal government may induce concerns of fragmentation, which “can yield 
conflicting policies that frustrate each other, or duplicative policies that waste effort 
. . . [or] gaps [that are] unaddressed.”198 But all regulation is fragmented across 
some dimensions, and so delegating all federal regulatory authority over 
environmental issues to EPA would fragment environmental regulations from other 
non-environmental regulations that apply to the same industry. Even environmental 
programs are generally fragmented by environmental media. 
The question, then, is not whether to fragment regulatory programs—they must 
be fragmented—but rather which shared features to organize together and which to 
fragment. Fragmenting across some dimensions—for example, allocating 
regulatory authority over environmental problems across multiple agencies—may 
allow integrating others, such as coordinated environmental and non-environmental 
regulation of a particular sector. 
In sum, the question of whether an environmental or non-environmental agency 
would most effectively administer an environmental provision does not as clearly 
favor the environmental agency as one might initially assume. Environmental 
agencies have the advantage of environmental expertise and focus, but 
non-environmental agencies offer their own advantages. In particular, the 
organization of embedded environmental laws199 and their institutional setting200 
may work in combination to free embedded environmental laws from the 
constraints of existing environmental regulatory systems and provide circumstances 
conducive for experimental environmental lawmaking and closer coordination with 
non-environmental programs. 
3. Political Functions 
As political conditions such as the degree of partisanship and the particular 
parties in power of the Presidency and Congress change, the viability of different 
forms of legislation changes as well. Differences in the features of embedded 
environmental laws and the environmental law canon lead them to function 
differently politically, in ways that likely affect their relative political viability. 
First, the mere existence of an alternative to the canonical form of 
environmental law increases the political viability of enacting some new 
                                                                                                                 
 
 197. See Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). 
 198. Jonathan B. Wiener, Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in 
Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210, 218 (2008). For other examples of the 
ample academic literature noting the problems of fragmentation, see, for example, James M. 
Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 11–12 (2000); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared 
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1147–48 (2012); Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard 
L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and 
Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1814–15 (2002). 
 199. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 200. See supra Part II.C.2. 
2014] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON 1275 
 
environmental law. EPA and its canonical regulatory programs have sometimes 
been201—as they are currently202—a political lightning rod. The backlash against 
EPA represents not only resistance to concrete aspects of the agency’s specific 
programs, but also considerable use of EPA as a symbol of excessive and heavy-
handed regulation more generally.203 Such conditions pose a substantial obstacle to 
any legislation that would attempt to invest EPA with additional authority, and also 
reduces the Agency’s ability to effectively implement its existing authorities. In 
such circumstances, environmental legislation in the canonical form is politically 
infeasible.204 Environmental provisions within larger non-environmental legislation 
that delegates to agencies other than EPA, on the other hand, may remain viable. 
Even in circumstances in which Congress might be willing to invest EPA with 
additional new authority, embedded environmental legislation may remain 
politically attractive. In conferring authority on EPA, Congress may be concerned 
whether the agency will be willing and able to act on its delegated authority.205 
Congress can mitigate the risk of EPA implementation failure, or indeed 
implementation failure by any particular agency, by legislating across multiple 
fronts—for example, multiple embedded environmental laws administered by 
different agencies, or both canonical and embedded environmental laws—thereby 
improving the likelihood that some policy to address the problem will be 
implemented.206 Delegating environmental laws across a broader range of 
institutions could allow other agencies to implement substitute policies when EPA 
is stymied. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 201. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 192, at 25 (describing a pattern of alternating “pro-
environmental excess” and “anti-environmental excess” that caused EPA to suffer from 
“battered agency syndrome”). 
 202. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also infra note 241. 
 203. See, e.g., John Boozman, Regulation Overload, SENATE.GOV (Jan. 22, 2013), http://
www.boozman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2013/1/regulation-overload (assailing “excessive 
regulations” by various federal agencies, and citing EPA as the “biggest offender”). 
 204. Environmental legislation may, however, be more politically viable than 
alternatives. Pennsylvania’s recently enacted Act 13, governing natural gas drilling in the 
state, imposes charges on unconventional natural gas wells. The Republican governor, Tom 
Corbett, has successfully defended the charges as an impact fee rather than a tax. See Brad 
Bumsted, Corbett Disputes Claim that Impact Fee Is Tax, PITT. TRIB.-REV., Nov. 22, 2011 
(noting Governor Corbett’s argument that the levy on unconventional natural gas drilling is not a 
tax but “a fee to cover government costs associated with drilling”). But see Elizabeth Stelle & 
Nathan Benefield, What’s the Difference Between a Tax and a Fee?, COMMONWEALTH FOUND. 
(May 31, 2011), http://www.commonwealthfoundation.org/policyblog/detail/whats-the-difference
-between-a-tax-and-a-fee (“[T]here are many reasons why [the impact fee] more closely 
represents a tax than a fee.”). Evidently new taxes can be even more politically combustible 
than new environmental regulation. 
 205. Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 949 n.84 (2008) (“The EPA’s pattern of missing statutory deadlines 
has been well documented.”). 
 206. See Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory 
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 292–94 (2011) (noting that redundant delegations 
of regulatory authority can increase the likelihood of successful regulatory action). 
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Second, the politics of embedded environmental laws differ from the politics of 
the environmental law canon because embedded environmental laws are part of 
legislation and programs that do not focus overall on environmental protection. 
Major legislation focused on environmental protection generally has no advantages 
over the status quo to offer the would-be regulated industries, as a result of which 
the regulated industries generally have strong incentive to attempt to kill 
environmental legislation.207 Some state governments, moreover, may resist 
large-scale expansions of federal environmental regulation that displaces more 
lenient state-level regulation and pressures state governments into assisting in 
implementation.208 Embedded environmental provisions, by contrast, are contained 
within statutes that focus on goals other than environmental protection, many of 
which may be advantageous to an industry. Thus, for example,209 although farmers 
may have opposed the Sodbuster and Swampbuster restrictions in isolation, 
because they condition farmers’ eligibility for many federal farm program benefits 
on minimum standards of protection for certain environmentally sensitive lands,210 
the overall Food Security Act included numerous provisions, such as price supports 
and farm loans, that benefited farmers.211 
Third, the political stakes will tend to be smaller for embedded environmental 
laws than for major environmental legislation. Embedded environmental laws tend 
to impose lighter economic burdens on a narrower range of regulatory targets, and 
therefore invite less political opposition than a major environmental statute. By 
contrast, even a relatively insignificant amendment to a canonical environmental 
statute can implicate large political stakes, because one attempt to amend a statute 
can be perceived to create opportunities for other amendments to the statute, 
quickly escalating the stakes for what started as a proposal for a small change.212 
Thus, the same provision could be politically far less combustible in terms of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 207. But see RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING 
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 209 (2d ed. 2006) (noting 
that industries in the 1960s “acquired a powerful new interest in obtaining moderate and 
uniform federal standards that would preempt more stringent and inconsistent state and local 
standards,” laying the foundation for a national Clean Air Act). 
 208. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and 
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1995) (“State and local governments 
argue that federal regulations infringe on their autonomy and sovereignty, and that they 
impose costly unfunded mandates states can ill afford.”). 
 209. Sodbuster denies eligibility to farmers who convert highly erodible land to crop 
production without an approved soil conservation system. 16 U.S.C. § 3811 (2012). 
Swampbuster denies eligibility to farmers who convert a wetland to crop production. Id. § 3821. 
 210. See supra note 169 (explaining the Sodbuster and Swampbuster provisions). 
 211. See, e.g., Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 401, 99 Stat. 1354, 
1395–1406 (providing loan program for feed grains); id. § 801, 99 Stat. at 1441–43 
(providing price support for soybeans). 
 212. Cf. Fiorino, supra note 185, at 480 (“None of these constituencies is willing to 
abandon the existing legal and regulatory framework without assurances that their agendas 
will be protected.”); Roger P. Hansen & Theodore A. Wolff, Reviewing NEPA’s Past: 
Improving NEPA’s Future, 13 ENVTL. PRAC. 235, 246 (2011) (“The problem with amending 
NEPA is that it opens a Pandora’s box of amendments offered by vocal NEPA opponents to 
weaken, water down, or even eliminate NEPA or its effectiveness.”). 
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environmental politics as a provision of a larger piece of non-environmental 
legislation than as an amendment to a major environmental statute. On the other 
hand, the politics of the other field into which an embedded environmental law is 
inserted are important as well. Embedding environmental provisions in non-
environmental legislation is likely to be more politically viable than amending a 
major environmental statute primarily in situations in which the non-environmental 
legislation falls within a field in which there is less political controversy than in 
environmental policy.213 
Fourth, the fact that embedded environmental law is dispersed and involves 
comparatively low stakes may make it a more difficult target for political 
organizing by interest groups. This may give Congress and agencies more 
discretion and autonomy in making environmental law out of the political spotlight. 
The difficulties of political organizing with regard to embedded environmental 
laws may, however, disproportionately burden environmental groups. Industry 
groups likely are already well organized with respect to the various congressional 
committees and agencies that regulate them and who would be responsible for new 
embedded environmental laws—for example, the congressional agriculture 
committees. Environmental groups, on the other hand, would tend to be better 
organized and familiar with the committees and agencies responsible for canonical 
environmental law—for example, the House Natural Resources Committee and the 
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. Moreover, whereas EPA is 
sometimes accused of exhibiting bias against industry,214 sector-specific agencies 
such as the Department of Agriculture and Department of Transportation are often 
characterized as captured by their respective industries.215 Thus, embedded 
environmental laws may tend to be less stringent than environmental laws in a 
canonical form. But canonical environmental legislation is often not politically 
viable; embedded environmental laws may sometimes be the only available option. 
Despite the potential advantages of embedded environmental laws, one type of 
embedded environmental law—appropriations riders—exemplifies the potential 
downsides to noncanonical environmental legislation. Appropriations riders are 
isolated legislative provisions attached to larger appropriations bills to take 
advantage of the larger bill’s political momentum and the relative lack of process 
                                                                                                                 
 
 213. How the embedded environmental law fits into the field in which it is embedded 
also affects its political viability. The political difficulty of embedding an environmental 
provision in a statute of another field likely increases as the salience of the statute in the 
other field increases, although the efficacy of an environmental provision embedded in a 
statute of another field likely also increases as the salience of the statute in the other field 
increases. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 214. See, e.g., MINORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, 111TH CONG., 
EPA’S ANTI-INDUSTRIAL POLICY: “THREATENING JOBS AND AMERICA’S MANUFACTURING 
BASE” (2010). But see Jeff Nesmith, Senators Attack Mercury Proposal; EPA Accused of 
Pro-industry Bias, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 13, 2004, at 3A (reporting senators’ allegation 
that proposed EPA regulation showed pro-industry bias). 
 215. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 23, 84 n.148 (1995) (contending that industry-specific agencies are susceptible 
to capture by their respective industries). 
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and deliberation in appropriations legislation.216 Environmental appropriations 
riders, often creating exemptions from environmental requirements, have 
proliferated in recent decades,217 roughly coinciding with the ongoing legislative 
stagnation on broader environmental legislation. As Richard Lazarus has observed, 
this development represents a trend away from “coherent, comprehensive 
environmental legislation” and toward appropriations riders as an important form 
of environmental legislation, a development that Lazarus criticizes as 
“nondeliberative, back-door, private deal-making” that undermines deliberative 
democracy.218 
Although environmental appropriations riders pose a cautionary example 
regarding the potential for democratically unsound embedded environmental laws, 
many embedded environmental laws do not share the defects of appropriations 
riders. Embedded environmental laws such as section 4(f) of the Department of 
Transportation Act219 and the Swampbuster and Sodbuster provisions of the Food 
Security Act220 embody constructive environmental policies enacted through a 
standard legislative process. Accordingly, the example of environmental 
appropriations riders serves as a cautionary reminder of how embedded 
environmental laws can be misused, but does not support a categorical critique of 
embedded environmental laws. 
D. Weighing Advantages and Disadvantages 
As the discussion in Part II.C indicates, the distinctive features of noncanonical 
environmental laws present both benefits and costs in terms of effectiveness, and 
each of the potentially useful features of embedded environmental laws has a 
possible downside as well: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 216. Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy 
in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 635–36 (2006). Perhaps the most (in)famous 
environmental appropriations rider is the Energy and Water Development Appropriation 
Act, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437, 449–50 (1979), which overrode the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), holding that the 
ESA prohibited completion of the Tellico Dam project in Tennessee because it would 
destroy the endangered snail darter’s habitat. 
 217. Lazarus, supra note 216, at 640–47.  
 218. Id. at 622; see also Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the 
Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 476 
(1997). But see Scott H. Segal & Jonathan H. Adler, Appropriations Riders and 
Environmental Reform: How Appropriate? 13 (Competitive Enterprise Institute Entl. 
Discussion Paper 95-3, 1995) (arguing that appropriations riders are a beneficial “means of 
holding unresponsive agencies in check”). Not all environmental appropriations riders are 
“anti-environmental.” See, e.g., Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-54, §§ 104–106, 119 Stat. 499, 521–22 
(2005) (restricting offshore oil and gas leasing in certain areas); H.R. REP. NO. 111-316, at 
109 (2009) (directing EPA “to carry out a study on the relationship between hydraulic 
fracturing and drinking water”). 
 219. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2006). 
 220. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811–3813 (2012); id. §§ 3821–3823. 
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• Embedding environmental law provisions in non-environmental statutes 
and programs may result in more coherence among those laws, but 
perhaps at the cost of inconsistency with other environmental laws. 
• Delegating environmental protection to agencies other than EPA may 
broaden the scope of environmental law and policy, but other agencies 
may lack expertise to understand complex environmental issues or 
commitment to environmental protection. 
• Non-environmental agencies may enjoy a less acrimonious relationship 
with the private sector, but they also may be less assertive regulators as 
well. 
• Dispersed programs may be more agile and conducive to experimentation, 
but they also may be more susceptible to regulatory capture and may 
exhibit the disadvantages of fragmentation. 
Because of their potential downsides, embedded environmental laws as a 
category do not always function better than canonical environmental laws. In many 
circumstances, the ideal environmental statute may take the form of 
“comprehensive environmental legislation” that Richard Lazarus rightly lauds as 
the backbone of American environmental policy.221 But broad canonical 
environmental statutes are not necessarily more effective than embedded 
environmental provisions in every instance. And even when perhaps theoretically 
preferable, canonical environmental legislation often is politically not viable. Thus, 
embedded environmental law provides a superior alternative to canonical 
environmental law either where it is functionally superior to canonical 
environmental law or where canonical environmental law is not available. 
In addition to the possibility of substituting for canonical environmental law, 
embedded environmental laws also can serve as a valuable supplement to canonical 
environmental laws. Here are two examples of environmental laws administered by 
non-environmental agencies and embedded within non-environmental programs, 
working synergistically with canonical environmental statutes administered by 
EPA. 
First, the Internal Revenue Code imposes an excise tax on ozone-depleting 
chemicals, with the amount of the tax increasing over time and with the ozone-
depleting potential of the substance.222 The excise tax, enacted as part of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,223 supplements other regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
 
 221. Lazarus, supra note 216, at 622. 
 222. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681–4682 (2006); see also 26 C.F.R. § 52.4682–1 (2013). 
 223. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106. The tax came to be enacted through an “almost 
serendipitous consensus.” Thomas A. Barthold, Issues in the Design of Environmental 
Excise Taxes, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1994, at 133, 136. The World Resources Institute had 
advocated for a tax on ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons in a 1986 report. J. Andrew 
Hoerner, Taxing Pollution, in OZONE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 39, 39 (Elizabeth 
Cook ed., 1996). In 1989, President George H.W. Bush, following an earlier similar proposal 
from EPA under the Reagan Administration, see Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. 
Reg. 30,604 (proposed Aug. 12, 1988) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking asking for 
public comment on a possible fee or auction for ozone-depleting substances), proposed to 
restrict the consumption and production of chemicals that deplete stratospheric ozone by 
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initiatives, undertaken pursuant to the Montreal Protocol and enacted as part of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, that directly limit production and 
consumption of ozone-depleting substances.224 Some have concluded the excise tax 
has been “probably more effective in eliminating the production of offending 
chemicals than the regulatory provisions” it was intended to supplement.225 
Second, a provision of the Federal Aid Highways Act226 establishes the 
Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) Program, which authorizes the 
Department of Transportation to use federal transportation funding to support 
transportation projects that contribute to air quality improvements.227 Some specific 
elements of the program specifically target projects that contribute to a state’s 
efforts to attain a National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) under the 
Clean Air Act.228 The CMAQ Program is consistent with a provision in the Clean 
Air Act prohibiting any “department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal 
Government” from approving or assisting “any activity” that does not conform to a 
state’s efforts, through a state implementation plan (SIP), to attain a National 
Ambient Air Quality Standard.229 The CMAQ Program, however, goes beyond 
merely prohibiting efforts that undermine air quality and provides affirmative 
support for projects that improve air quality. Congress added the CMAQ Program 
to the Federal Aid Highways Act as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act of 1991.230 
Embedded environmental laws also work synergistically with NEPA, a 
canonical environmental statute not administered by EPA. When NEPA and 
embedded environmental laws apply in conjunction with each other,231 NEPA’s 
                                                                                                                 
auctioning the rights to produce such chemicals. See Barthold, supra, at 136–37. Meanwhile, 
a Congressional Budget Resolution had directed the House Ways and Means Committee and 
the Senate Finance Committee to raise more revenue. See id. at 137; Hoerner, supra, at 41. 
Individual members of both committees already had proposed bills that included taxes on 
ozone-depleting substances, motivated in part to raise revenue and in part to address ozone 
depletion. See Barthold, supra, at 137; Hoerner, supra, at 40–41. The convergence of efforts 
to limit ozone-depleting and an objective to raise tax revenue created conditions conducive 
to the bipartisan support that enacted the excise tax. See Barthold, supra, at 137. The dual 
objectives of the tax—to protect the ozone layer and to raise revenue—highlight how the tax, 
like other embedded environmental laws, falls within the fields of both tax law and 
environmental law. 
 224. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (Aug. 12, 1988) (codified at 
40 C.F.R. §§ 82.1–.13 (2013)). The Clean Air Act provisions are codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7671–7671m (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
 225. John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National 
Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 93 (1998). 
 226. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101–190 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 227. Id. § 149. 
 228. See id. § 149(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 229. 42 U.S.C. § 7506 (2006). See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Improving 
Transportation-Related Air Quality Under the Clean Air Act’s Conformity Requirement and 
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 631 (1997) 
(describing the background of this conformity requirement). 
 230. Pub. L. No. 102-240, § 1008, 105 Stat. 1914, 1932. 
 231. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 613 F.3d 76 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (applying NEPA and the Plant Protection Act to the Department of Agriculture’s 
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primary contribution differs from its usual role of integrating environmental 
concerns with other policy objectives. The embedded environmental laws already 
put environmental concerns on the agency’s agenda. NEPA, however, integrates 
embedded environmental laws into a broader body of environmental law—NEPA 
law—that establishes a process and framework for considering environmental 
concerns. This process and framework are especially important for agencies that 
lack significant environmental experience and expertise. At the same time, because 
NEPA’s dictates are broad and only procedural, it allows agencies the flexibility to 
tailor their NEPA processes to their own specific statutory directives. NEPA 
essentially provides institutional support for the implementation of embedded 
environmental laws.232 
Together, these three examples illustrate how embedded environmental statutory 
provisions can supplement and complement canonical environmental statutes. Even 
if they will never and should never fully displace conventional environmental laws, 
noncanonical environmental laws deserve consideration as a potentially useful tool 
in the environmental law toolbox. 
E. Looking Forward: Three Challenges for Next-Generation Environmental Law 
Although to date embedded environmental law has been overshadowed by the 
environmental law canon, it has the potential to play a much more significant role 
in environmental law moving forward. In particular, embedded environmental law, 
by virtue of its differences from the environmental law canon, offers an alternative 
model for environmental lawmaking that may complement, or even to some extent 
substitute for, more conventional policy responses in addressing the major 
challenges currently facing environmental law. Part II.E will discuss the potential 
application of embedded environmental law to meeting three such challenges: 
legislative stagnation, integration with non-environmental law, and climate change. 
The attributes of embedded environmental law identified in Part II.B make 
embedded environmental laws a valuable and perhaps essential component of an 
effective solution to these challenges. 
1. Stagnation 
Environmental law, at least in Congress, has stagnated. Canonical 
environmental legislation, by virtue of the size of the programs it enacts and the 
costs it imposes on the industries it regulates, automatically generates resistance 
and therefore requires tremendous political support to be enacted. The landmark 
federal environmental statutes that comprise the environmental law canon 
required—and received—broad bipartisan support in Congress when they were 
                                                                                                                 
regulation of importation of solid wood packaging material); Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Transp., 42 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying NEPA and section 4(f) to the 
Federal Highway Administration’s approval of a tollroad project). 
 232. This is not to say, however, that an agency can or should attempt to meld the statutes 
entirely. See, e.g., Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 203 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (noting that “[a]lthough an agency’s analysis under NEPA and the Transportation Act 
might proceed in similar tracks, the two statutes are not precisely the same,” and proceeding 
to identify differences therein). 
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enacted in the 1970s. Support for environmental protection was a consensus 
issue.233 
Political conditions have changed dramatically since the 1970s. Commentators 
describe a climate of “bitter partisan gridlock” 234 and a “starkly partisan divide”235 
on environmental issues in Congress. Since the 1970s Democrats and Republicans 
in Congress have sharply diverged in their support for environmental protection.236 
Environmental issues have become a proxy for an ideological battle over the 
appropriate extent of federal regulatory authority.237 “What began in 1970 as a 
relatively bipartisan political issue has become, thirty years later, a largely partisan 
issue about which there is little common ground between the two political 
parties . . . .”238 
Whatever the causes of the loss of political consensus and the increasing 
politicization of environmental issues at the federal level,239 the current political 
context is highly inhospitable to the enactment of major environmental legislation 
and has been so for quite some time. Indeed, environmental lawmaking in Congress 
has been largely at an impasse for two decades now. The last major federal 
environmental statute was the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.240 The impasse 
shows no signs of abating; if anything, the prospects for significant new federal 
environmental legislation seem bleaker than ever. EPA has become a political 
lightning rod, a target for ridicule by Republican political candidates and 
congressional leaders.241 In the face of congressional inaction, EPA is forced to use 
old statutes to address new environmental issues.242 
                                                                                                                 
 
 233. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 8, at 224 (noting that in the early 1970s “solidly 
bipartisan majorities [in Congress] vested this new agency [(EPA)] with sweeping new 
powers”); Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1002, 1003 n.17 (noting the “overwhelming majorities” 
and “lopsided votes” that enacted environmental statutes in the 1970s). This is not to imply 
that the enactment of major federal environmental statutes during these periods was 
nonpolitical. See generally, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN 
COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981). 
 234. Andrews, supra note 8, at 255 (“For the present, it is clear that any hope of 
significant environmental policy reform in Congress continues to be held hostage to bitter 
partisan gridlock . . . .”). 
 235. Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1004 (“Today, however, a starkly partisan divide exists in 
environmental law.”). 
 236. Id. at 1012–13. 
 237. See Andrews, supra note 8, at 238. 
 238. Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1019. 
 239. See ANDREWS, supra note 207, at 350–51 (discussing some causes, including a 
reassertion of organized opposition from business interests, passive public support, and the 
use of the environment as a symbolic issue). 
 240. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. Congress enacted two somewhat significant 
environmental statutes in 1996—the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-170, 110 Stat. 1489, and the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613—but neither would qualify as part of the environmental law 
canon, a major environmental law on the order of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 
or the landmark legislation of the 1970s. 
 241. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 14. 
 242. For example, although the Clean Air Act is not well-suited to address climate 
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In the current era of extreme partisanship and political stalemate, especially in 
environmental policy, embedded environmental law’s distinctive features are likely 
to give it more political viability than canonical environmental law. Embedded 
environmental laws avoid EPA, instead delegating authority to agencies such as the 
Department of Agriculture that may enjoy more bipartisan support in Congress. 
Embedded environmental laws can be part of a legislative package, such as an 
energy policy bill or farm bill, that contains many elements advantageous to 
industry. Embedded environmental laws involve smaller political stakes and are 
more conducive to innovative and experimental policy solutions that may enjoy 
broader political appeal. 
Recent legislative events support the proposition that environmental laws 
outside the canon may be more politically viable than environmental laws in a 
canonical form. Despite the legislative gridlock of the last decade, Congress 
recently has enacted some significant—not major, but nevertheless significant—
pieces of environmental legislation: 
• The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Reauthorization Act of 2006243 amended and reauthorized the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,244 the primary federal 
statute regulating fisheries.245 
• The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008,246 also known as the 
2008 Farm Bill, contained a provision that significantly amended the 
Lacey Act,247 a 1900 statute that prohibits trafficking in illegal fish, 
wildlife, or plants. The 2008 amendments expanded the Lacey Act’s scope 
to include more plants and plant products, including illegally logged 
timber.248 
• The Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009,249 an amalgamation 
of 164 separate bills relating to public lands, among other things 
designated millions of acres of new wilderness and a thousand miles of 
new wild and scenic rivers.250 
All three of these statutes exhibit markedly noncanonical characteristics. The 
Lacey Act amendment exemplifies the features of embedded environmental law. 
                                                                                                                 
change, in the absence of climate change legislation, EPA has been forced to take regulatory 
action to address climate change under the Clean Air Act. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that EPA could avoid taking regulatory action under the Clean Air 
Act with respect to greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles only if it were to 
determine that such greenhouse gas emissions do not contribute to climate change). 
 243. Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007).  
 244. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891d (2012). 
 245. See Robin Kundis Craig, Taking the Long View of Ocean Ecosystems: Historical 
Science, Marine Restoration, and the Oceans Act of 2000, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 649, 668 (2002). 
 246. Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651. 
 247. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (2012). 
 248. Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 8204, 122 Stat. at 2052–56. 
 249. Pub. L. No. 111-11, 123 Stat. 991. 
 250. See Congress Votes ‘Yes’ to Sweeping Public Lands Protection Act, ENV’T NEWS 
SERVICE NEWSWIRE, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2009/2009-03
-25-01.asp. 
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Although the Magnuson-Stevens amendments and the Omnibus Public Land statute 
fall within the category of subcanonical environmental laws rather than embedded 
environmental laws, they share several key features in common with embedded 
environmental laws, and these features contribute to their political viability. 
First, none of these new statutes is administered by EPA. The National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), an agency within the Department of 
Commerce, administers the Magnuson-Stevens Act.251 The Department of 
Agriculture, and specifically the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, 
enforces the new Lacey Act provisions.252 Various federal land management 
agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management, Forest Service, and National Park 
Service, administer the newly designated public lands.253 
Second, all three statutes pursue additional objectives beyond environmental 
concerns—that is, they are “mixed-motive” environmental statutes. The 
Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act includes provisions sought by the fishing 
industry to manage fisheries.254 The Lacey Act amendments protect U.S. timber 
companies from underpriced imports.255 The Omnibus Public Land Act includes new 
historical parks and water supply projects.256 
Third, the three statutes sweep narrowly compared with canonical environmental 
statutes. Although they are significant, fisheries management, illegally logged timber, 
and new public lands designations do not match the breadth of the canonical 
environmental statutes, which regulate large swaths of the American economy. 
Not only was Congress able to enact these statutes during a period of overall 
political stagnation on environmental issues, it was able to do so on a bipartisan basis 
with wide margins. The reauthorization of Magnuson-Stevens was bipartisan 
compromise legislation, endorsed by both conservation groups and the fishing 
industry257 and passed in both the House and Senate by voice vote.258 The Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act and Omnibus Public Land Management Act passed by 
wide bipartisan margins in both the House and Senate.259 
                                                                                                                 
 
 251. See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., MAGNUSON-STEVENS 
REAUTHORIZATION ACT FACT SHEET (2008), available at http://www.noaa.gov/factsheets
/new%20version/magstevens.pdf.  
 252. See, e.g., Implementation of Revised Lacey Act Provisions, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,874 
(Feb. 28, 2011). 
 253. See Omnibus Public Land Management Act, 123 Stat. 993–95 (identifying the 
agency associated with each set of new authorizations). 
 254. See Allison A. Freeman, Attention Turns to House as Magnuson Breezes Through 
Senate, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, June 20, 2006 (quoting a statement approving elements of the 
legislation by a representative of the National Fisheries Institute, a fishing industry group). 
 255. See Dan Berman, Illegal Timber, Omnibus Parks Bills Lead House Suspension 
Calendar, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 3, 2007. 
 256. See, e.g., Omnibus Public Land Act §§ 7001–7003, 9101–9115, 123 Stat. at 1183–
89, 1298–1321. 
 257. See Freeman, supra note 254 (noting that the legislation passed the Senate by 
unanimous consent and that “[g]roups representing the fishing industry and environment and 
ocean advocates applauded the legislation”). 
 258. See Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 5946, LIBRARY CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi
-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR05946:@@@R. 
 259. See Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 146, LIBRARY CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi
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It is reasonable to conclude that the noncanonical character of these three statutes 
contributed to their political viability. The absence of EPA from the debate, the 
relatively confined scope of the legislation, and the multiple objectives of the 
legislation all enabled negotiation and compromise that eventually resulted in passage 
of the statutes. The absence of EPA, a political lightning rod, dampened opposition to 
the bills by reducing the political temperature of the debate. Perhaps most important, 
the multiple objectives of the three statutes increased support for the bills by 
broadening beyond environmentalists the range of interests who perceived a benefit 
over the status quo. Fishing interests joined conservationists in supporting the 
Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act because it contained changes perceived as 
beneficial over the existing statute.260 The American Forest and Paper Association 
joined environmentalists in supporting the Lacey Act amendments because it 
protected domestic timber suppliers from competition from illegally harvested 
imports.261 Tribes joined environmentalists in supporting the Omnibus Public Land 
Act because it included water development projects and tribal cultural protections 
beneficial to them.262 
This is not to say that passage of the statutes was uncontroversial or nonpolitical. 
The Magnuson Stevens Act required extensive negotiations among different camps of 
legislators and competing versions of legislation, prodded along at key points by 
Senator Ted Stevens, who was seeking a coda to his Senate career.263 The Lacey Act 
amendments were revised in committee to reduce compliance burdens, and 
languished in committee before finally being inserted into the broader Farm Bill.264 
The Omnibus Public Land Act triggered substantial opposition from Republicans.265 
But, unlike recent attempts to enact canonical environmental legislation, these three 
statutes were able to overcome the political obstacles in their paths and to gain 
                                                                                                                 
-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR00146:@@@R (noting the Omnibus Public Land Act passed the 
Senate by a 77–20 vote and the House by a 285–140 vote); H.R. 2419 (110th): Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us
/congress/bills/110/hr2419 (noting the legislation passed the House by a 318–106 vote and 
the Senate by a 79-14 vote, followed by similar votes to override President Bush’s veto). 
 260. See Freeman, supra note 254. 
 261. See Illegal Logging: Lacey Act, AM. FOREST & PAPER ASS’N (July 2013), 
http://www.afandpa.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/lacey-act-one-pager
-july-2013.pdf?sfvrsn=2.  
 262. See, e.g., Omnibus Public Land Management Act §§ 1506, 9106, 123 Stat. at 1040, 
1304–09. 
 263. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 254; Lauren Morello & Allison A. Freeman, 
Magnuson-Stevens Still in Play as Activists Plan for Dem Congress, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, 
Nov. 10, 2006; Allison Freeman Winter, Stevens Attempts to Revive Magnuson with New 
Proposal, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 7, 2006; Allison Freeman Winter, Last-Gasp Attempts 
at Magnuson Dead in Water—Rep. Gilchrest, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 6, 2006. 
 264. See Berman, supra note 255. 
 265. See Patrick O’Connor, House GOP Derails Public Lands Bill, POLITICO (Mar. 11, 
2009, 2:25 PM EDT), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/19894.html; R.J. Smith, 
Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 on House Floor Today—170 Bills in One; Half 
Have Had No Hearings, AMY RIDENOUR’S NAT’L CENTER BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009, 3:01 AM), 
http://www.conservativeblog.org/amyridenour/2009/3/11/omnibus-public-land-management
-act-of-2009-on-house-floor-to.html. 
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passage, even by wide margins.266 In short, they succeeded where proposals for 
canonical environmental legislation have failed. 
Three anecdotal examples cannot prove a general conclusion, but they do 
provide some evidence supporting the idea that noncanonical environmental laws 
can remain politically viable during periods of strong partisan conflict over 
environmental issues when attempts to enact new canonical environmental laws 
may be thwarted. The history of embedded environmental legislation provides 
further support for this proposition. Unlike canonical environmental law, which has 
tended to be enacted during a specific period from 1970 to 1990, Congress enacted 
embedded environmental laws before,267 during,268 and after269 the heyday of 
canonical environmental legislation. 
2. Integration 
Environmental law’s shortcomings can be measured by the mismatch that exists 
between environmental problems and environmental law. In part because of the 
political stagnation on environmental issues, existing environmental laws do not 
adequately address environmental problems. The Clean Water Act, for example, 
largely exempts nonpoint source discharges, even though such pollution is a major 
cause of impaired water quality.270 Meanwhile, science continues to identify new 
potential hazards, such as chemical toxicity at low exposure levels previously 
assumed safe.271 
Not all the mismatch between environmental problems and environmental law 
arises from a lack of law; the law itself contributes to some environmental 
problems. Numerous laws incentivize conduct that causes environmental harm. For 
example, tax breaks for the oil and gas industry subsidize fossil fuel production and 
therefore consumption and its associated air pollutant emissions.272 
                                                                                                                 
 
 266. See supra notes 258–59. 
 267. See, e.g., Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063, 1068 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (2012)); Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 
89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2006)). 
 268. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, §§ 1221–1223, 99 Stat. 1354 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821–3823 (2012)) (Swampbuster). 
 269. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1501, 119 Stat. 594, 1067–76 
(amending Clean Air Act § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545). 
 270. See Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 608, 616 
(2008) (“Unregulated nonpoint source pollution is solely responsible for failure of 30 to 50 
percent of U.S. waterbodies to meet water quality standards and is a contributing factor in an 
even larger percentage.”). 
 271. Jody A. Roberts, Collision Course? Science, Law, and Regulation in the Emerging 
Science of Low Dose Toxicity, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2009); see also Daniel A. Farber, 
Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 791 (1994) 
(“The expansion of scientific knowledge has revealed new environmental problems . . . .”). 
 272. See John A. Bogdanski, Reflections on the Environmental Impacts of Federal Tax 
Subsidies for Oil, Gas, and Timber Production, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323, 325–28 
(2011); Roberta Mann, Waiting to Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1135, 1164–68 (2002); Temi Kolarova, Comment, Oil and Taxes: Refocusing the Tax 
Policy Question in the Aftermath of the BP Oil Spill, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 351, 357–66 
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Laws such as these that unintentionally yet significantly affect the environment 
are generally excluded from what we consider environmental law, because they do 
not deliberately address environmental concerns.273 Yet if the project of 
environmental law at its most fundamental level is to think critically and 
comprehensively about the relationship between law and the environment, then 
unintentional environmental laws should be integral to environmental law. 
Excluding laws that have inadvertent environmental impacts creates a problematic 
divide between environmental problems and environmental law. Indeed, addressing 
unintentional environmental laws may well be among the most efficacious 
endeavors the field can undertake. 
As environmental law has matured, awareness has grown that the goal of 
environmental protection is highly implicated elsewhere other than within the 
domain addressed by existing canonical environmental law. Proposals for 
environmental reforms seem increasingly aimed to address environmental concerns 
as they arise outside of environmental law, such as in land use,274 energy,275 and 
food production.276 Underlying these proposals is the premise that environmental 
concerns should suffuse the law generally to the same extent that environmental 
impacts do; wherever there are environmental problems, there should be 
environmental law.277 
                                                                                                                 
(2012). See generally Barthold, supra note 223, at 133 (noting other examples of tax 
provisions with unintentionally adverse environmental consequences). 
 273. See supra note 23 (defining environmental law as laws that deliberately address 
human impacts on the environment). 
 274. See, e.g., Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land 
Use Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231 (2008); John R. Nolon, Comparative 
Land Use Law: Patterns of Sustainability, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 855 (2006). 
 275. See, e.g., Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 
supra note 32; Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and 
Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369 (2011). 
 276. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, Food, Law & the Environment: Informational and 
Structural Changes for a Sustainable Food System, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 263 (2011); Neil 
D. Hamilton, The Role of Law in Promoting Sustainable Agriculture: Reflections on Ten Years 
of Experience in the United States, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 423 (1998); Michael R. Taylor, The 
Emerging Merger of Agricultural and Environmental Policy: Building a New Vision for the 
Future of American Agriculture, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 169, 170 (2001); see also Ristino & Kalen, 
supra note 13, at 52 (“The environmental law of the future must incorporate energy, food, 
transportation, land use, and water, just to name a few. And it must do so unconstrained by our 
existing, arguably simplistic, federalist, regional, and local models.”). 
 277. Many of these proposals to expand the reach of environmental concerns in the law 
invoke the principle of sustainability as a conceptual foundation. See, e.g., Robert L. 
Glicksman, Sustainable Federal Land Management: Protecting Ecological Integrity and 
Preserving Environmental Principal, 44 TULSA L. REV. 147, 151 (2008); Hamilton, supra note 
276; Nolon, supra note 274. The ambiguity of the related terms sustainability and sustainable 
development have led some scholars, however, to doubt their usefulness as conceptual anchors. 
See Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse, 
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 64 (2000) (“The problem with the sustainable development 
concept is that it is subject to a variety of interpretations.”); Glicksman, supra, at 148 (“The 
various formulations of sustainability have been criticized as, among other things, vague, 
slippery, oxymoronic, a ‘mask[er] [of] failed consensus,’ and a reflection of political 
correctness.” (footnotes omitted)); J.B. Ruhl, Law for Sustainable Development: Work 
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Canonical environmental law does not, however, offer an attractive or viable 
model for integrating environmental concerns into the law. Treating canonical 
environmental law as the sole model for an expansion of environmental law would 
erect a substantial barrier to entry into the field that is unlikely to be overcome 
except in rare circumstances. Canonical environmental laws are big. The 
environmental law canon regulates rather intensively, in terms of the burdens it 
places both on regulated parties who must comply with its requirements and on 
regulatory agencies that must administer and enforce the requirements. This 
intensity and the burdens it entails may be entirely appropriate for the 
environmental problems that the environmental law canon addresses—the 
environmental law canon has tended to focus on the most pressing environmental 
problems, which potentially call for comparatively intensive regulatory 
responses—but intense regulation is not necessarily appropriate for all 
environmental problems. Limiting the options of environmental law to large, 
intense regulatory programs limits environmental law’s viable domain. 
Moreover, integrating environmental concerns into new areas of law that 
currently unintentionally yet significantly affect the environment will require a 
better integration of environmental concerns with other policy objectives.278 The 
environmental law canon, by design, focuses overwhelmingly on environmental 
concerns. Although statutes within the canon usually mandate some balance 
between environmental protection and other non-environmental goals, the intent 
and effect of such balancing is merely to moderate the stringency of environmental 
protection so as to mitigate other adverse non-environmental regulatory impacts, 
not to affirmatively pursue other goals. For example, section 202 of the Clean Air 
Act directs EPA to establish emissions standards for new motor vehicles “which 
reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable” while “giving 
appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety factors.”279 The inclusion of 
cost, energy, and safety as factors for EPA to consider may lead EPA to moderate 
the stringency of the emission reduction it requires pursuant to section 202. But in 
doing so section 202 is merely mitigating its impacts on these factors, not 
affirmatively promoting them—section 202 considers safety, but it is not a safety 
regulation.280 Unintentional environmental laws, however, do pursue and promote 
other, non-environmental objectives. As a result, adding environmental concerns 
                                                                                                                 
Continues on the Rubik’s Cube, 44 TULSA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2008) (noting that the concept of 
sustainable development is in part “window dressing,” “a way of masking over problems,” “a 
way of demanding more than is possible,” and “a way of promising more than is possible,” 
“which goes a long way toward explaining why it has become so powerful a policy concept”). 
 278. Cf. John C. Dernbach, Achieving Sustainable Development: The Centrality and 
Multiple Facets of Integrated Decisionmaking, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 247, 250 
(2003) (arguing that integrated decision making—decision making that integrates 
environmental and other objectives—is the foundation of sustainable development). 
 279. Clean Air Act § 202(a)(3)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006). 
 280. Canonical environmental statutes do, however, sometimes contain individual 
provisions that pursue objectives entirely independent of the statute’s overall environmental 
protection goal. Clean Water Act § 513, 33 U.S.C. § 1372 (2006), for example, requires 
laborers and mechanics constructing treatment works using federal grants under the Clean 
Water Act to be paid prevailing wages. It is a labor law, administered by the Labor 
Department, but otherwise embedded in an environmental statute. 
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into unintentional environmental laws will require integrating environmental and 
non-environmental goals in a way that the environmental law canon has not 
attempted. 
Embedded environmental law may offer a better model than canonical 
environmental law for pursuing environmental protection in the frontier areas 
outside of the traditional domain of environmental law. Whereas canonical 
environmental law gives environmental protection primacy and is segregated from 
other, non-environmental law, embedded environmental law integrates 
substantively and institutionally with non-environmental law.281 The environmental 
policies that result from such an integration will no doubt depart from the dominant 
model of the environmental law canon, but that can be a positive development. 
Delegating environmental authority to non-environmental agencies, for example, 
could serve as an important step toward inculcating environmental values in 
agencies that have not tended to view environmental protection as an important 
objective within their programs. For example, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development has relied on statutory authority in the form of embedded 
environmental provisions to require new public housing to comply with energy 
efficiency standards.282 
3. Climate Change 
The massive and “super wicked”283 problem of anthropogenic climate change 
looms over all other environmental issues. Despite the legislative paralysis on the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 281. NEPA, by requiring federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of their 
proposed actions even when those actions are taken pursuant to non-environmental statutes, 
does some of the work of integrating environmental concerns into non-environmental law. 
But NEPA’s requirements are purely procedural and not substantive—it requires agencies 
only to consider the environmental effects of their proposed actions, not to give any weight 
to environmental concerns. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 
350 (1989). This significantly limits NEPA’s efficacy and makes the statute an imperfect 
substitute for substantive environmental requirements. Cf. The National Environmental 
Policy Act 40th Anniversary Symposium, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,183, 11,195 (2010) 
(transcribing an unidentified audience member’s comment that “NEPA is procedural, it is in 
many instances window-dressing”). 
 282. See 42 U.S.C. § 12709 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (requiring Secretary to establish 
standards); id. § 12745(a)(1)(F) (requiring compliance with standards); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-46, GREEN AFFORDABLE HOUSING 11 (2008) (concluding 
that HUD had taken “positive steps” to promote energy efficiency but could do more within 
its existing authority). 
 283. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining 
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159–60 (2009) (explaining 
that climate change is a “super wicked problem” because of its “enormous 
interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders,” because “the 
longer it takes to address the problem, the harder it will be to do so,” because “”those who 
are in the best position to address the problem . . . [have] the least immediate incentive to 
act,” and because of “the absence of an existing institutional framework of government with 
the ability to develop, implement, and maintain the laws necessary to address a problem of 
climate change’s tremendous spatial and temporal scope”); see also Kelly Levin, Benjamin 
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issue,284 EPA is moving forward with addressing climate change under its existing 
statutory authorities, primarily the Clean Air Act.285 But no one believes that current 
laws, even if they are better than nothing, offer the best policy mechanisms for 
addressing climate change. 
The dominant proposals to date have involved some type of statutory program that 
would regulate greenhouse gas emissions in a form resembling the statutes of the 
environmental law canon, such as a cap-and-trade emissions program administered 
by EPA.286 Such a program has not been viable politically at the national level. 
Moreover, some academics, policy analysts, and environmental advocates have 
questioned whether a global system of conventional pollution regulation is the best 
model for addressing climate change. Some of these critics argue that conventional 
environmental regulation is ill-suited to the unprecedented challenges that climate 
change poses, and instead favor a strategy of quickly moving the economy toward the 
use of low-carbon energy sources through direct public investment in technological 
innovation.287 Others are less critical of conventional regulation, but advocate for 
sector-specific policies as an alternative to a system that universally regulates 
greenhouse gas emissions.288 
Alternative approaches of these types—direct investment or sector-specific 
regulation—could take the form of embedded environmental laws. Such programs 
could be designed to take advantage of the best features of embedded environmental 
laws: dispersed, relatively small programs that reduce the political stakes and 
facilitate experimentation and context-specific policy solutions. 
                                                                                                                 
Cashore, Steven Bernstein & Graeme Auld, Playing It Forward: Path Dependency, 
Progressive Incrementalism, and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Global Climate Change, 5–
7 (June 3, 2010), available at http://environment.research.yale.edu/documents/downloads/0-9
/2010_super_wicked_levin_cashore_bernstein_auld.pdf (originating the term “super wicked” 
and applying it to the problem of climate change). 
 284. See generally Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill 
Effort in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A15; Ryan Lizza, supra note 12; Elizabeth 
Kolbert, Uncomfortable Climate, NEW YORKER, Nov. 22, 2010, at 53. 
 285. See Climate Change: Regulatory Initiatives, EPA, http://www.epa.gov
/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.html (last updated Sept. 24, 2013). 
 286. See Res. for the Future, Summary of Notable Market-Based Climate Change Bills 
Introduced in the 111th Congress, RFF.ORG (May 12, 2010), http://www.rff.org/Documents
/Features/111th%20_Legislation_Table_Graph.pdf. 
 287. See, e.g., HOWARD A. LATIN, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY FAILURES: WHY 
CONVENTIONAL MITIGATION APPROACHES CANNOT SUCCEED 162–70 (2012); MCKINSEY & 
CO., PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY 32–34, 59–129 (2009); TED NORDHAUS & 
MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, THE EMERGING CLIMATE CONSENSUS: GLOBAL WARMING POLICY 
IN A POST-ENVIRONMENTAL WORLD 14 (2009), available at http://www.thebreakthrough.org
/blog/PDF/EmergingClimateConsensus.pdf. 
 288. See, e.g., PEW CTR. FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, POLICIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS 
FROM THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR 3 (2008) (“[S]ector-specific measures to promote 
energy efficiency and low carbon technologies may be needed to ensure significant GHG 
reductions from transportation.”); Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, Toward an 
International Aviation Emissions Agreement, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 385 (2012) 
(arguing in favor of an international greenhouse gas emissions reduction agreement specific 
to the aviation sector); Jake Schmidt, Ned Helme, Jin Lee & Mark Houdashelt, Sector-Based 
Approach to the Post-2012 Climate Change Policy Architecture, 8 CLIMATE POL’Y 494 
(2008) (arguing the advantages of a sector-based approach). 
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First, relatively small climate change programs dispersed throughout government 
would have potentially greater political viability than a universal emissions system of 
regulation administered by EPA. Much of the private sector already regards EPA as 
heavy handed and draconian in its orientation and is likely to regard EPA regulation 
with particular suspicion and with a proclivity and history of organizing political 
opposition to the Agency’s initiatives. The private sector is more likely to be open to 
initiatives from other agencies. Many other agencies, especially sector-specific 
agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, Department of Transportation, and 
Department of Energy, administer a wide variety of programs, both regulatory and 
nonregulatory, many of which proactively assist the sector. Like other embedded 
environmental laws, climate policies could be integrated into broader programs that 
pursue a variety of objectives. 
Second, dispersed climate change programs could facilitate experimentation and 
context-specific policy solutions better than a centralized system of universal 
emissions regulation. Such a strategy could involve broad policy principles 
coordinated across government, but implemented through sector-specific policies 
administered by sector-specific agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, 
Department of Transportation, and Department of Energy. In the absence of 
comprehensive policy, specific climate policies could be used to experiment with 
various strategies that could be utilized to implement future comprehensive 
regulation. For example, agricultural policies that nudge farms toward less carbon-
intensive energy consumption could mitigate the impacts of an eventual 
comprehensive cap-and-trade or carbon tax that would significantly raise the cost of 
carbon-intensive fuels. 
Regardless of whether dispersed sector-specific climate policies would 
supplement or substitute for a system of universal climate emissions regulations, 
dispersed climate policies in the form of embedded environmental laws could by 
virtue of their distinct functional features provide significant benefits beyond what a 
universal uniform regulatory system could attain. 
III. UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
In addition to offering a model for environmental lawmaking that provides a 
potentially important alternative to the environmental law canon, noncanonical 
environmental laws can generate important conceptual insights. In particular, 
noncanonical environmental laws, by virtue of their location at the periphery of the 
field of environmental law, can offer illumination into some of environmental law’s 
existential issues. 
A. Expanding the Recognized Domain 
Including noncanonical environmental laws in the study of environmental law 
expands the recognized domain of environmental law beyond the canon that currently 
predominates in the field. Bringing environmental laws from outside of the canon 
into the study of environmental law broadens the scope of laws associated with the 
field overall. This more expansive view of environmental law reveals the field’s 
topography to be more varied than it appears from conventional viewpoints that focus 
solely on the canon. Embedded environmental laws, for example, evidence that 
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environmental law has been produced in forms and at times quite different than the 
canon of major regulatory programs that arose during the Environmental Revolution 
of the 1970s.289 Expanding the scope of recognized environmental law beyond the 
canon thus reveals the form of the canon—including the problems it addresses, the 
institutions it has created, and the regulatory mechanisms it employs—to be a 
contingent product of a particular historical moment. The environmental law canon is 
not merely the result of Americans embracing environmental values, but rather also 
involved a series of choices regarding how to embody environmental values in the 
law. Embedded environmental laws thus can remind us of the underappreciated 
diversity of ways in which law can pursue environmental protection. To borrow John 
Witt’s observations in a different context, conventional accounts of the development 
of environmental law often “tacitly assume a determinate relation between a 
particular course of social change . . . and a particular regime or doctrinal structure” 
in environmental law.290 Embedded environmental laws counteract a tendency to 
assume the inevitability or essentiality of the environmental law canon. 
B. Central and Peripheral Cases 
At a deeper conceptual level, noncanonical environmental laws can provide 
material for the exploration of some of the central questions about the field to an 
extent that environmental laws within the canon cannot do by themselves. To see 
how, we can analogize the distinction between the environmental law canon and 
noncanonical environmental laws to the distinction in legal philosophy drawn 
between a central case and a peripheral or limit case. 
Scholars of legal philosophy exploring the concept of law have differentiated 
between law in its central case, which lies at the heart of the category of law, and law 
in its peripheral or limit case.291 Here, a central case is an instance of something 
within a category that exhibits all the features properly associated with the category; a 
peripheral case does not have all of these features, but enough of them to fall within 
the category.292 Although there is disagreement about the extent to which productive 
analytical inquiry should focus on central cases versus peripheral cases, there seems 
                                                                                                                 
 
 289. See supra notes 267–69 and accompanying text (noting that embedded 
environmental laws have been enacted during times in which canonical environmental 
lawmaking has not been active). 
 290. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 9 (2004) (“[B]oth of the 
conventional historical accounts [of the development of modern American accident law] 
tacitly assume a determinate relation between a particular course of social change 
(industrialization) or a new intellectual development (changing ideas about causation) and a 
particular regime or doctrinal structure in accident law.”). 
 291. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 9–11 (2d ed. 2011); John 
Gardner, Nearly Natural Law, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 10–18 (2007). Finnis traces the central case 
concept to Aristotle’s focal meaning and Max Weber’s ideal-type. FINNIS, supra, at 9. 
 292. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 150 (1999) (contrasting “typical 
cases” in which the signature traits of a category “are manifested to a very high degree” and 
“borderline cases” “in which all or some [traits] are present only to a lesser degree”); see 
Gardner, supra note 291, at 15 n.25 (“There are various limit cases in which one or other of 
these features is lacking, while others remain.”). 
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to be some agreement that considering both types of cases in combination facilitates 
the appreciation of the overall category to its fullest. Thus, John Finnis contends that 
one can move from an examination of the central case to an examination of peripheral 
cases that “trace[s] the network of similarities and differences, the analogies and 
disanalogies, . . . between them and the central cases.”293 And John Gardner notes that 
neglecting either the central case or peripheral cases leads to analyses that “provide[] 
only a partial account of their subject.”294 
For the field of environmental law, the canon represents a type of central case, and 
noncanonical environmental law a peripheral case.295 Like the central case, the 
canonical environmental statutes exhibit all the features associated with 
environmental law—national pollution statutes enacted primarily for the purpose of 
protecting the environment and administered by EPA—with the notable exception of 
NEPA and the Endangered Species Act.296 Noncanonical environmental laws, on the 
other hand, have enough features associated with the field that they are recognized as 
environmental law—most notably, a goal of environmental protection—but do not 
exhibit many of the features otherwise associated with the field.297 
Despite its location at the periphery of the field, however—indeed, because of its 
location at the periphery of the field—noncanonical environmental law is crucial to 
understanding environmental law overall, including canonical environmental law. For 
example, noncanonical environmental laws raise, in a much more acute way than the 
statutes in the environmental law canon, the question of what is environmental and 
what is not. 
C. Blurring the Boundaries 
The field of environmental law is generally defined to encompass laws with a 
goal of environmental protection or limiting ecological impacts.298 But precisely 
                                                                                                                 
 
 293. FINNIS, supra note 291, at 11. 
 294. Gardner, supra note 291, at 23. 
 295. Scholars who have used the central-versus-peripheral case framework have tended to 
attach a direct normative superiority to the central case. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 291, at 3 
(describing the central case as “the case that shows how the other cases . . . ought to be”). But 
one can move from the normative, wherein the central case represents what the category ought to 
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THEORY 51–67 (2001). 
 296. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 297. See supra Part II.B. 
 298. See supra note 23; see also, e.g., JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 1. (“Environmental 
Law is law designed to protect the environment, and the plants and animals that rely on it, 
including us.”); LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 1 (“[E]nvironmental law regulates human activity in 
order to limit ecological impacts that threaten public health and biodiversity.”); Michael C. 
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ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 309, 310 (1992) (“Environmental law is a loose amalgam 
of common law and (increasingly) statutory provisions designed to protect public health, 
ecosystems, and dependent animal and plant species.”). 
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what objectives fall within this category is unclear. Traditional notions of what 
constitutes nature or the environment have been criticized as based on naïve visions 
“of a pristine nature that exists apart from people.”299 
Statutes within the environmental law canon tend not to clarify the issue, 
because their goals of protecting environmental public health and ecological 
concerns reside at the core of environmental law. The environmental-ness of these 
statutes is so obvious that we need not—and generally do not—explain how they 
are environmental. With respect to many environmental laws outside the canon, 
however, the environmental-ness is not so straightforward or clear: 
• Energy Efficiency. Congress originally enacted fuel economy standards for 
vehicles as part of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 to 
reduce demand for oil during the Oil Shock of the 1970s.300 Subsequent 
amendments to the statute—like energy policy generally—have to some 
extent incorporated environmental protection.301 
• Safety Statutes. Statutes such as the Hazardous Materials Transportation 
Act302 and the Pipeline Safety Act303 regulate to protect against accidents 
that threaten public safety. Accidents involving hazardous materials or 
pipelines clearly have adverse environmental effects, but the statutory 
purposes refer only to protection of “life and property.”304 
• Food Safety. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)305 
includes provisions that regulate food safety.306 One such provision, 
enacted as part of the Food Quality Protection Act’s307 amendments to the 
FFDCA, directs EPA to establish tolerances for pesticide residues in 
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 300. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 2, 89 Stat. 
871, 874 (1975). 
 301. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 
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 302. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5128 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
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 304. See 49 U.S.C. § 5101 (“The purpose of this chapter is to protect against the risks to 
life, property, and the environment that are inherent in the transportation of hazardous 
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 305. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 306. Id. §§ 341–350l-1. 
 307. Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996). 
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food.308 Pesticide tolerances are directed at the same public health goal as 
other food regulations in the FFDCA, such as prohibitions against false or 
misleading labeling on foods.309 Pesticide use does, however, have 
significant environmental implications, which are regulated under other 
statutes.310 
• Invasive species. Invasive species can have devastating ecological 
consequences.311 The Plant Protection Act, which aims to prevent the 
spread of invasive plant pests and weeds, mentions environmental 
protection as a goal,312 but focuses primarily on impacts on agriculture. 
• Conservation. Some conservation, such as the national parks system,313 
seems obviously to fall within the ambit of environmental protection. 
Other statutes, however, contemplate conservation for the purpose of 
maintaining supplies of a natural resource for future commercial 
exploitation.314 Still other laws fall somewhere in between.315 Whether 
laws that pursue conservation are environmental laws may depend on what 
resource is being conserved and for what purpose. 
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 315. For example, the Department of Agriculture’s soil conservation programs tie the 
abatement of soil erosion to a variety of concerns, some environmental and some not, 
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As these examples illustrate, considering noncanonical environmental laws both 
clarifies and muddies efforts to define what it means for a law to be an 
environmental law. On the one hand, focusing on the limit cases of the field 
(noncanonical environmental laws) can lead us to posit what seems to be a 
plausible conceptual delineation of the field’s boundary: environmental laws 
intentionally regulate human causes of ecological disruption. On the other hand, the 
fact that many noncanonical environmental laws also seem to lie as well within 
other recognized fields—such as transportation or agriculture—strongly indicates 
that environmental law, especially at its periphery, overlaps considerably with 
related fields. Environmental law, from this viewpoint, does not so much as end as 
it does fade into other, overlapping fields. 
D. Practical Implications 
The question of what is environmental has considerable practical as well as 
theoretical import. What is categorized as environmental—as opposed to 
agricultural, for example—matters because the classification of an issue as 
environmental affects the institutions that are called upon to address it (e.g., which 
congressional committee, which agency), the interest groups that mobilize to 
support or oppose it, the regulatory model assumed for creating law to address the 
issue, and even the theoretical approaches to analyzing the issue. 
The Swampbuster provision offers an example. Although the provision was 
enacted to conserve wetlands—a type of environmental protection—Congress 
enacted the Swampbuster as part of the Food Security Act,316 a farm bill that went 
through the House Agriculture Committee317 and Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry Committee;318 was delegated to the Department of Agriculture for 
implementation; and took the form of a condition on farm subsidies rather than a 
direct restriction. The same objective of wetlands conservation could be pursued—
and has been pursued319—in the form of environmental legislation that would go 
through the House Resources Committee and Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee, delegated to an environmental agency for implementation, and 
in the form of a direct restriction on the use of wetlands. 
Occupational exposure to toxic substances provides another example. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Act320 treats occupational exposure to toxic 
substances as an employment law issue, enacted by legislation that goes through 
the congressional labor committees, governed by a statute implemented by the 
Department of Labor. The Toxic Substances Control Act,321 however, treats the 
same problem as an environmental law issue, enacted by legislation that goes 
through the congressional environmental committees and is implemented by EPA. 
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Recognizing that the boundaries of environmental law are blurry, not sharp, and 
that many situations arising within environmental law—especially those outside of 
the canon—also arise within other fields, broadens the array of potential regulatory 
options for responding to environmental problems. Policy advocates and 
lawmakers decide—usually implicitly—about whether to frame an issue as 
environmental or as something else. Making that decision deliberately could create 
opportunities for laws that are more reflective of messy realities and better tailored 
to our complex needs. 
Indeed, full appreciation of the overlap between environmental issues and other 
areas of law might induce exploration of how new legal structures can develop to 
reflect these blurry boundaries and overlapping legal fields. Jody Freeman and Jim 
Rossi, for example, have examined how agencies can beneficially exercise 
coordinated concurrent regulatory jurisdiction—what they call “shared regulatory 
space.”322 Freeman and Rossi’s discussion of shared regulatory space, including the 
tools agencies can use to coordinate their overlapping regulatory jurisdictions and 
methods of assessing and improving coordination, is illuminating and instructive. 
They do not, however, discuss the ways in which overlapping boundaries of 
substantive legal fields—for example, environmental law and safety law—create an 
impetus for shared regulatory space, or how the design of shared regulatory space 
should reflect overlapping legal fields.323 More work is needed to develop legal 
structures and institutions with, for example, capability to address issues that 
implicate multiple fields, objectives, and perspectives. 
CONCLUSION 
The history of environmental law over the last four decades in the United States 
provides cause for both optimism and pessimism about the field’s future. The 
existing major environmental statutes that comprise the canon of environmental 
law have accomplished significant improvements in environmental quality while 
proving resilient in the face of sometimes harrowing political headwinds. On the 
flip side, however, the canon has calcified over time, proving resistant to reform 
and difficult to employ against emerging environmental threats. 
If it is to succeed in protecting human health and the environment, the 
environmental law of this new century may need to evolve into something that 
looks quite different from the extant environmental law canon. The next generation 
of environmental laws must be viable for creation and implementation even in an 
antagonistic political climate; amenable to integration with other, non-
environmental law; and able to make inroads against the monumental peril of 
global climate change. Environmental laws embedded in larger non-environmental 
programs offer an alternative model to the environmental law canon—an 
alternative model that seems well suited to a new generation of environmental law. 
The major federal pollution statutes that comprise the environmental law canon 
will continue to form the centerpiece of American environmental law for the 
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foreseeable future. But other environmental laws outside of the canon, and 
especially embedded environmental laws, have the potential to play a much greater 
role in environmental policy going forward. Such embedded environmental laws 
exhibit features quite different from the canonical environmental statutes: whereas 
major environmental statutes are large regulatory programs administered by EPA 
and focused on environmental protection, embedded environmental laws are 
dispersed, relatively small programs that often integrate environmental protection 
with other objectives. These features create important functional differences 
between the environmental law canon and embedded environmental laws, 
differences that in some circumstances give embedded environmental laws 
advantages over canonical environmental laws. The small size and narrow scope of 
embedded environmental laws, for example, facilitate experimentation and context-
specific policy solutions. Embedded environmental laws can sow the seeds of 
future broader changes in the law and can enlist the participation of new 
institutional actors with fresh perspectives and additional resources. 
Studying embedded and other noncanonical environmental laws also broadens 
and deepens our understanding of environmental law as a legal field. Noncanonical 
environmental laws are environmental laws but usually not only environmental 
laws—they also are labor laws, agriculture laws, or transportation laws as well. 
Environmental law should reflect this complicated and messy reality. Attempting to 
maintain a set of environmental laws segregated substantively and institutionally 
from other fields unduly constrains the project of environmental law, which in its 
essence should seek to suffuse environmental concerns into the law generally. 
Environmental effects are everywhere in the law, so environmental concerns should 
be spread throughout the law as well. 
